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Abstract
The thesis is structured in three articles which develop micro-
econometric analysis on the Italian banking industry. The first
two articles investigate, relying on different theoretical frame-
works and techniques, the degree of competition in the retail
segment whereas the third article examines the effects of rela-
tionship banking on firm innovativeness.
The first article is entitled "Intensity of Competition and Mar-
ket Structure in the Italian Banking Industry". The aim of
this work is to empirically test Sutton’s predictions for indus-
try with exogenous sunk costs in the Italian banking industry.
In particular, I focus my attention only on the retail segment
since products are rather standardized and there is a limited
scope for cost-decreasing or quality increasing investments.
The second article is entitled "Unit Roots and the Dynamic of
Market Shares". In this article I rely on panel unit roots tests
in order to infer the degree of competition in the industry. The
main idea is to verify if market shares of the first five banks
contain unit roots. If so, it is possible to infer that there is
the chance for competitors to displace permanently the leader.
On the contrary, if share are mean reverting, it is reasonable
to infer that the industry is rather stable, and actors reached
positions difficult to overcome.
The third article is entitled "Relationship lending and Firm
innovativeness: New Empirical Evidence". The aim of this
study is to test the effect of firm-bank ties on the degree of firm
innovativeness using data on a sample of Italian manufacturing
firms. In particular, this article departs from previous micro-
econometric works since it distinguishes the discovery phase
from the introduction phase of new technologies.
xii
Chapter 1
Intensity of competition
and Market structure in
the Italian Banking
Industry
Abstract
This work tests the predictions of Sutton’s model of independent submar-
kets for the Italian retail banking industry. In the first part of this paper,
I develop a model of endogenous mergers to evidence the relationship be-
tween firms’ conduct, market entry and market structure. In the second
part, I identify the submarket dimension and estimate the relationship
between market size and market structure using data on bank branches.
The size of the submarkets turned out to be at most provincial whereas
the limiting concentration index - as argued by Sutton for industries with
exogenous sunk costs - goes to zero as the market becomes larger.
Keywords: Concentration, Truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial
models, quantile regressions
JEL Classification: C24, D43, L11, L89
1.1 Introduction
Sutton’s model of independent submarkets emphasizes the strategic choice
of sunk costs and, unlike the traditional structure-conduct-performance
approach, considers how changes in firms’ conduct affects the condition
of entry, altering by consequence market structure. Under this scheme,
both homogeneous-horizontally differentiated products and advertising-
R&D intensive (vertically differentiated products) industries can be anal-
ysed. For the former type of industries, with fixed sunk costs, it is possible
to show an inverse relationship between market size and market struc-
ture. For the latter type of industries, where sunk costs are endogenous,
such a negative relationship does not necessarily emerge as market size
increases. This is because sunk costs, such as advertising or R&D expen-
diture, raise with market size. Such expenditures are choice variables of
(perceived) quality: by increasing the level of advertising-R&D, firms are
able to gain (or to maintain) market share. Therefore, as market size be-
comes larger, an ‘escalation mechanism’ could raise fixed costs per firm
to such an extent that the negative relationship between market size and
market structure will break down. Sutton’s model offers therefore very
clear and testable predictions about the relationship between market-size
and market-concentration. The aim to this paper is to analyse the Ital-
ian retail banking industry as a special case of the first type of industries,
since products are rather standardized and there is a limited scope for
cost-decreasing or quality increasing investments. This industry can be
viewed as made of a large number of local markets that arise because
there are many different geographical locations throughout the country:
in every submarket products are fairly good substitutes and banks com-
pete against each other by means of their branch locations. The degree of
substitutability is substantially lower for products and services offered in
neighbour submarkets. In the first part of this paper, relying on the model
developed by Vasconcelos (2006), I examine the firm strategic behaviour
referring to a three-stage non cooperative game. In line with Sutton’s the-
ory, the aim is to highlight the relationship between firm conduct, entry
and market structure while explicitly allowing for a merger process in the
1
industry. In so doing, it is possible to show that the incentives to merge
to a monopoly are lead by the intensity of competition and by the degree
of product substitution. This ultimately shows how the number of banks
as well as the share of the main bank are determined in each submarket,
and offers indications on the variables to be used in the empirical section.
In the second part, I will estimate the market structure-market size rela-
tionship in the Italian retail banking industry. Testing this relationship
empirically requires identifying a set of independent submarkets. In order
to do that, I estimate the number of firms in each province using data on
the national bank branch location. To take into account that the number
of firms is discrete and greater than zero, a truncated Poisson and Nega-
tive Binomial models are used. This analysis confirms that the province
(at most) is the size of each submarket. In fact, firm variables related
to neighbour provinces turned out to be insignificant in determining the
number of bank in each province. Once the size of the submarket has
been identified, I will investigate the market structure-market size rela-
tionship by regressing the one firm concentration ratio on the market size
variables. As the limiting concentration ratio approaches zero as market
size goes to infinity, the hypothesis of exogenous sunk costs for the retail
banking industry can be accepted. The paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents the theoretical framework to analyse the relationship
between firm conduct and concentration based on the Sutton approach.
Sections 3 and 4 describe respectively the banking industry referring to
this framework and the characteristic and the construction of the dataset.
In section 5 the econometric model and results are presented. Conclusions
are in the final section.
1.2 The theoretical approach
Sutton (1991, 1997, 1998) describes the impact of firm conduct on market
structure identifying two key aspects: the intensity of competition and
the level of endogenous sunk costs. Considering these elements, he distin-
guishes between two general types of industry. One class is characterized
by industries that produce homogeneous and horizontally differentiated
2
products. The other category is composed of industries engaged in the
production of vertically differentiated products. In the first type of indus-
tries, the only important sunk costs are the exogenously determined setup
costs, given by the technology. In such industries Sutton (1998) predicts
a lower bound to concentration, which goes to zero as the market size
increases and rises with the intensity of price competition. The idea is
that as market size increases, profits also increase, and given free entry,
other firms will enter the market until the last entrant just covers the ex-
ogenous cost for entry. Also, the higher the competition, the higher the
concentration index. In fact, as the competition gets stronger, the entry
becomes less profitable and the higher the level of concentration is to be in
order to allow firms to cover their entry cost1. It is important to underline
that the intensity of competition will not simply represent firm strategies
but, rather, the functional relationship between market structure, prices
and profits. It is derived by institutional factors, and therefore is not
only captured by the price-cost margin. More generally, an increase in
the intensity of competition could be represented by any exogenous influ-
ence that makes entry less profitable, e.g the introduction of a competition
law (Symeodonis (2000), Symeodonis (2002)). In the second type of in-
dustries sunk costs are endogenous. Firms pay some sunk cost to enter
but can make further investments to enhance their demand. As market
size increases, the incentive to gain market share through advertising and
R&D expenditure also increases, leading to higher fixed cost per firm.
Even though room for other firms is potentially created, the ‘escalation
mechanism’ will raise the endogenous fixed costs, possibly breaking down
the negative structure-size relationship that exists in the other type of in-
dustries. For such industries Sutton’s model predicts that the minimum
equilibrium value of seller concentration remains positive as the market
grows2. Sutton’s model offers very clear predictions for the first group of
1A way to model an increase in the ‘toughness of price competition’ is to consider a
movement from monopoly model to Cournot and Bertrand model. For any given market
size, the higher the competition at final stage, the lower the number of firms entering
at stage 1, and the higher the concentration index (ex-post). See Sutton (2004).
2To be more precise, Sutton goes further in distinguishing within the endogenous
cost categories between low-α and high-α industries. In the low-α type industries, due
to R&D trajectories, we will still observe low level of concentration
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industries whereas it is not possible for industries where sunk costs are
endogenous. Despite Sutton’s insights on the relationship between mar-
ket concentration and market size, there are few empirical works testing
these predictions. Previous works that test the Sutton approach are Sut-
ton (1998) for the US Cement Industry, Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) for
the Italian Motor Insurance Industry, Asplund and Sandin (1999) for the
Swedish Driving Schools Sector, (Walsh and Whelan (2002)) in Carbon-
ated Soft Drinks in the Irish retail market, Hutchinson et al. (2006) across
manufacturing industries in UK and Belgium, and Ellickson (2007) for
the supermarket industry in the United States. These papers mainly test
Sutton’s predictions by typically looking if a measure of firm inequality
- such as the Gini coefficient - increases with the number of submarkets.
Specific to the banking sector are the works of Dick (2007) for the Banking
Industry in the United States and de Juan (2003) for the Spanish Retail
Banking Sector. Although Dick (2007) investigated the relationship be-
tween market size and market concentration, she considered the banking
industry without distinguishing the retail segment from the wholesale. In
particular, she focused on banking quality through a set of variables, such
as geographic diversification, employees compensation and branch density,
finding a non-decreasing concentration ratio as market size gets larger.
She concluded that endogenous quality model characterized the industry.
de Juan (2003) analysed instead another important insight of Sutton’s
analysis: the degree of concentration and the level of aggregation of sub-
markets. Focusing on retail market only, and after having identified the
individual submarkets, she tested the bound on the inequality of firm size
distribution at different levels, local, regional and national. The purpose
of this paper is to verify if empirical evidence for the Italian retail banking
industry is consistent with Sutton’s predictions. To apply this framework
to the Italian banking industry is of interest since during the nineties it
experienced a deregulation and consolidation process. Therefore, in order
to identify the relationship proposed by Sutton, the choice of the year is
crucial. I will assume that the industry reached in 2005, the year of the
analysis, an equilibrium. Similar to de Juan (2003), I will make an effort
to empirically test the size of the submarket but I will depart from her
4
work by investigating the market size- market concentration relationship.
As the focus is on the retail banking, this paper also differentiates from
Dick (2007) as she considered both the industry segments, wholesale and
retail. The present paper is also strictly related to the theoretical analysis
developed by Cerasi (1996). Cerasi developed a model of retail banking
competition in which banks compete first in branching and then in prices.
In line with Sutton’s analysis her model predicts that deregulation should
lead to an increase in the degree of concentration whereas, with respect
to branching, an increase in market size is followed by a decrease in the
degree of concentration in branching.
1.3 Exogenous sunk cost industries: the model
Using the model developed by Vasconcelos (2006), as modified in order to
explicitly account for the intensity of competition, this section analyses the
market size-concentration relationship in exogenous sunk cost industries.
In such industries, firms will face some sunk cost to enter but cannot make
further investment in order to enhance their demand. Assuming that all
consumers have the same utility function over n substitute goods (or n
varieties of the same product) as follows:
U(x1, ....., xn;M) =
∑
k
(xk − x2k)− 2σ
∑
k
∑
l<k
xkxl +M, (1.1)
where xk is the quantity of good k and M denotes expenditure on
outside goods whose price is fixed exogenously at unity. The parameter σ,
0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, measures the degree of substitution between goods3. When σ =
0 the cross product term in the utility function vanishes so that product
varieties are independent in demand, whereas if σ = 1, the goods are
perfect substitutes. For the utility function (1.1), the individual demand
for good k is:
3This is a quadratic utility function and it has previously used by Spence(1976),
Shaked and Sutton (1990), Sutton (1997, 1998) and Symeodonis (2000). The banking
sector is usually analysed under hotelling-type model. However, it is possible to show
that any hotelling-type model is a special case of vertical production differentiation.
See Cremer and Thisse (1991).
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pk = 1− 2xk − 2σ
∑
l 6=k
xl (1.2)
If there are S identical consumers in the market and we denote with
xk the per-capita quantity demanded of good k, market demand for this
good is Sxk.
Considering now a three stage game. In the first stage, a sufficiently
large number of ex-ante identical firms, N0, simultaneously decide whether
or not to enter the market incurring an entry cost of . In the second stage,
firms that have decided to enter decide to join a coalition. All the firms
that have decided to join the same coalition then merge. In the third
stage, firms set their output. All coalitions are assumed to face the same
marginal cost of production c, which we can normalize to zero.
1.4 The game: equilibrium analysis
In stage 2, each firm i ∈ {1, ...., N} simultaneously announces a list of
players that it wishes to form a coalition with. Firms that make exactly
the same announcencement form a coalition together. For example, if
firms 1 an 2 both announced coalition {1, 2, 3}, while firm 3 announced
something different, then only players 1 and 2 form a coalition. Since all
firms are initially symmetric, members of each coalition are assumed to
equally share the final stage profit.
Let λ = dxjdxi represent firm i’s conjectural variation, that is its ex-
pectation about the change in its competitors production resulting from
a change in its own production level, and assume that this conjecture is
identical for all firms (λi = dxjdxi = λ).
Assuming that quantity is a strategic variable, profit maximization
requires that ∂Πi/∂xi = 0. In equilibrium:
xi =
1
2(2 + (N − 1)σ(1 + λ)) (1.3)
and the profit of each of the N firms is
6
SΠi = S
1 + λ(N − 1)σ
2(2 + (N − 1)σ(1 + λ))2 − F (1.4)
Let Λ be equal to σ(N −1)λ. It is possible to refer to Λ as the competitive
intensity of the industry, with lower values of Λ corresponding to more
intense competition.
For F ≥ 0, N ≥ 2 and −1 ≤ Λ ≤ 1 , and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 each firm’s profit is
a decreasing function of the number of firms in the industry, its competitive
intensity and the amount of fixed costs. Two reasons could lead firms to
merge: market power and efficiency. To maintain things simpler, I avoid
to account for efficiency gains. In this analysis, firms could not make any
further investments to enhance their quality (and hence the demand) of
the product offered. So, it possible to set F = 0. In any case, a clear
picture in similar framework is offered by Rodrigues (2001).
Following the traditional backward induction procedure, I analyze the
condition under which I get a monopoly in exogenous sunk cost industries
model.
Quantity setting stage Let N2, N2 ≤ N ≤ N0, denote the number
of coalitions of firms at the end of stage 2. From equation (1.4) firm profits
are
SΠ(N2) =
1 + Λ
2(2 + σ(N2 − 1) + Λ))2 (1.5)
Coalition formation stage At this stage those firms who entered
may merge to form a coalition. A coalition structure is said to be an
outcome of a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to either (indi-
vidually) migrate to another coalition or to stay alone (Vasconcelos (2006);
Yi (1997))4. Consider a coalition structure composed of coalitions of the
same size. It is said to be stand-alone stable if
N2
N
[SΠ(N2|Λ, σ)] > S[Π(N2 + 1)|Λ, σ] (1.6)
4To be more precise, this latter case in which no firm can unilaterally improve its
payoff by forming a singleton coalition is called stand-alone stability. However, stand-
alone stability is a necessary condition for Nash stability.
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In case of monopoly, N2 = 1. Hence, in order for a single ‘grand coali-
tion’ to be the outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation
game in exogenous sunk cost industries, the following is a necessary and
sufficient condition5
Π(1)/N > Π(2) (1.7)
Hence,
(1 + Λ)
2(2 + σ + Λ))2
<
1
8N
N <
(2 + σ + Λ))2
4(1 + Λ)
≡ N¯(σ,Λ) (1.8)
I restrict the industry conjectural variation coefficient to the range −1 ≤
Λ ≤ 1. In so doing, the possibility of Λ being larger than the value that
would imply perfectly collusive post-merger behaviour is restricted.
A merger towards monopoly leads to the formation of a single grand
coalition with N firms. A firm belonging to the initial wave of N entrants
will get a share 1/N of the coalition overall profits, whereas by free-riding
on its N-1 merging rivals it can obtain duopoly profits. Each time in which
the ‘grand coalition’ is unstable, as market size increases, more firms want
to enter and to free ride and form a duopoly instead of joining the grand
coalition. That means, as the market size rises, the concentration ratio
goes down 6. This result shows how this process in turn can affect the one
firm concentration ratio, C1 = qN2q = 1/N2.
When Λ lies in the range previously defined, and fixed costs are zero,
N(σ,Λ) is strictly decreasing in Λ. Therefore, the weaker the competitive
intensity, the larger the pre-merger market concentration should be for a
monopoly to emerge through merger.
In particular, if σ = 1, we can rewrite equation (1.8) as
N <
1(Λ + 3)2
4(Λ + 1)
(1.9)
5The only possible deviation it is in fact towards the singleton coalition.
6It is valuable to remark that in this model it is implicitly assumed that the pre-
merger behaviour is not affected by the coalition formation stage.
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The RHS is strictly decreasing in Λ. As Λ approaches -1, the value
of perfect competition, condition (1.9) is alway satisfied, and so, merger
to monopoly would occur whatever the number of firms in the industry.
Hence, the higher the intensity of competition at stage 3, the lower the pre-
merger market concentration could be in order for a monopoly to emerge
through merger. When Λ = 0, that is firms behave as in Cournot, monop-
olization will occur only if σ ≥ 0.83. If this condition is not met and more
than two firms enter in stage 1, and merge in a single grand coalition, that
equilibrium might not be stable. As σ approaches 1, competition becomes
tougher as products are closer substitutes, and the lower bound to the one
firm concentration ratio decreases as market size increases. On the other
hand, in perfectly cooperative industries, where Λ = 1, or when demands
are perfectly independent, where σ = 0, merger to monopolization will
never occur. However, it is important to remark that we are not consid-
ering cost efficiency gains that would probably give an incentive to merge
even in the case that market demands are completely independent.
Entry stage At stage 1 firms decide to enter.
If σ = 1 products are perfect substitutes, a merger to monopoly will
occur at the second stage of the game if firms compete very toughly. Then,
if firms anticipate that a monopoly coalition structure is going to be formed
at stage 2, firms will enter up to a point at which N is the largest integer
value satisfying
1
N
(SΠ(1)) ≥  (1.10)
where  > 0 is the entry fee. By the same reasoning, therefore, if the
competitive intensity is extremely strong, the firms will merge to monopoly.
For any given level of market size, the equilibrium level of concentration
is higher. However, entry will occur at the first stage and the lower bound
to concentration goes down7. If products are imperfect substitutes - and
Λ = 0 - a merger to monopoly might not take place. In particular, when
7Also, from the previous analysis, since ∂Π/∂N < 0 and ∂Π/∂Λ > 0, by applying the
implicit function theorem, one concludes that ∂N/∂Λ = −∂Π/∂Λ
∂Π/∂N
> 0. The equilibrium
number of firms is decreasing in the intensity of competition at stage 3.
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σ < 0.83, a merger to monopoly might not take place since a firm could
prefer to get all the profits of a duopolist. This means that as the market
size rises, more firms enter and this makes the monopoly unsustainable
as individual firms want to free ride and form a duopoly. Thus, there is
an upper bound to concentration that goes down as market size increases
(Vasconcelos (2006)).
1.5 The Italian retail banking industry
The presence of different territorial dynamics is a characteristic of the
Italian banking industry (Guiso et al. (2004, 2006); Colombo and Turati
(2004)). I consider the retail Italian banking industry as belonging to an
industry of the first type, where sunk costs are exogenous and the size of the
submarkets is provincial. Since lending and borrowing take place mostly in
a narrow geographical place and operation are similar and repeated during
time, this industry can in fact be viewed as made of a large number of local
markets, corresponding to different provinces (geographical units close to
US counts). These submarkets are independent both from the supply
and demand side. On the supply side, in each one of these independent
submarkets, banks’ goods are fairly substitute whereas banks’ products
of neighbouring provinces are not. In particular, in each province banks
can mitigate price (interest rate) competition by means of their branch
location8. However, opening new branches, independently of the size of
their operations, has fixed costs, for example the cost of hiring personnel,
the cost of renting or buying facilities in particular province and other
province specific elements. As documented in (Cerasi et al. (2000)), in Italy
in the recent years, as a result of reforms on entry and branching regulation,
the cost of branching has decreased. On the demand side, despite the
advances in home and phone banking, preferences of customers seem to
be still biased toward entities with strong regional and local contents. A
customer is likely to shop only at those banks that operate in the local area
where he lives and works. In other words, zero/small cross-elasticities are
likely to characterize the demand of geographically separated submarkets
8See also Cerasi et al. (2002) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2004)
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whereas positive elasticities are likely to characterize the demand in each
province.
1.6 Exogenous or endogenous sunk costs?
As we would expect both exogenous and endogenous sunk costs to be rel-
evant in the banking industry, with both horizontal and vertical differen-
tiation, some point of remarks are deserved. In this work I am considering
the retail sector by looking at branches as the main distributional channel
of certain standardized banking products. Therefore, I am not looking as
in Dick (2007) at branches, as one of the costs in advertising and quality
(employee compensation, branch staffing) that banks will incur in order to
enhance consumer willingness to pay. Indeed, as banks become more and
more visible through branches, one could consider branches as a form of
advertising itself. In other words, I am assuming that branches of different
banks offer similar (bundle of) services despite bank size and, hence, the
number of branches in a given submarket could be considered as the num-
ber of varieties of services offered by banks. Even in the case, however,
there are circumstances in which endogenous costs could arise. As pointed
out by Petersen and Rajan (1995) relationship lending may generate severe
barriers to entry. However, the advent of information and communication
technologies increased the ability of banks to open branches in distant
locations, considerably reducing the cost of distance-related trade and en-
hancing competition in local banking markets (Berger and Udell (2006),
Affinito and Piazza (2005))9. In addition, developments in the financial
industries with new contracts and new intermediaries are likely to reduce
the role of close bank-firm relationships (Rajan and Zingales (2003)). The
opinions are not unique. Whatever the conclusion might be, we can foresee
that it will at least influence the structure of the banking system in terms
9 Besides, Berger himself has recently taken an opposite view with respect to his
previous study (Berger et al. (2003)) where it is claimed that services to small firms
are likely to be provided by small banking institutions since they meet the demands
of informationally opaque SMEs that may be constrained in the financing by large
institutions. He now claims that this vision could be an oversimplification: new trans-
action technologies are now available enabling large banks to overcome informational
constraints.
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of the local nature of the banks but not the number of branches that could
be opened given market demand10. It is obvious that in the industry as
a whole (retail and wholesale) both endogenous and exogenous interact
costs with one another to determine market structure. The approach and
conclusion could be very different (Dick (2007)).
1.7 Market equilibrium
The predictions of Sutton’s model apply to markets in equilibrium. How-
ever, discontinuities in the normative (or economic) conditions can lead to
process of consolidation. Unless when are observing the market at the end
of this process, it will be difficult to disentangle the relationship between
competition and concentration as predicted by Sutton from that caused
by mergers and acquisitions. This means that I am making the implicit
assumption that the retail baking sector reached an equilibrium in 2005,
the year for which I collected the observations. This assumption - though
strong - seems reasonable. Beginning in the 1980s, the Italian Banking
system underwent a series of reforms aimed at increasing the competition
in the market through liberalizing branching and easing the geographical
restrictions on lending. In fact, the opening of new branches had been
regulated by the ‘branch distribution plan’, issued every four years. The
last distribution plan was issued in 1986 and, since March 1990, the estab-
lishment of new branches has been completely liberalized. The number of
branches increased steadily, up to 31.081 in 2005, as well as the number
of people served by each branch, 47 per 100.000 inhabitants in 2004 (com-
pared to 59 EU mean). In particular, the number of banks mergers and
acquisitions of control per year was 45 in 1990 and decreased substantially
to 5 in 200511. At the same time, in more than 50% of the provinces, new
banks entered the market. This process of new entry, parallel to the pro-
10To have a picture of the role of local banks and how the probability of branching
in a new market depends on the features of both the local market and the potential
entrant, see Di Salvo et al. (2004), Bofondi and Gobbi (2004) and Felici and Pagnini
(2005).
11Referring to December 2005. It is important to remark that the process of consoli-
dation with foreign banks is now gaining relevance. See ICB (2004).
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cess of consolidation, made the average number of banks in each province
rise from 29 in 1990 to 34 in 2005.
1.8 Characteristics and construction of the
dataset
The dataset is composed of 103 Italian provinces and 784 banks. In total,
there are 85 groups of banks to which 230 banks belong. The greater part of
banks, 554, does not belong to any group. The Italian territory is divided
into 20 regions and 103 provinces, which are geographical units close to
US counties. For each provinces, I have data on the number of banks
and their number of branches for the year 2005 as collected by the Italian
Central Bank (Banca d’Italia)12. I also have data about GDP, number
of inhabitants, density of population as collected by National Institute of
Statistics (Istat). According to the criteria developed below, four provinces
will be excluded when estimating the submarket size since these are - by
definition - considered ‘isolated’ provinces13. A description of the variables
involved in the analysis follows, as well as indications for the theoreticals
variables they should account for. The name of the variable that will be
used in the empirical assessment is reported in square brackets. Summary
statistics are reported in tables (1).
• Concentration = C1
To measure concentration the ‘one-bank concentration ratio’, [C1],
is used. The bank concentration ratio is defined as the fraction of the
number of branches owned by the largest bank within the market.
• Market size = S
12http://siotec.bancaditalia.it/sportelli/main.do?function=language\
&language=ita.
13These provinces are: Potenza, Palermo, Trapani and Sassari. Therefore,
in that case I considered 573 banks or group of banks over 99 provinces for
a total of 2673 observations. I do not consider in this count the num-
ber of branches belonging to foreign banks. For further information, see
ICB (2005) and http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/ricec/relann/rel05/
rel05it/vigilanza/rel05_attivita_vigilanza.pdf
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It is likely to vary with the level of demand measured by GDP ,
[V A_pct], and by population, [logPOP ], in the province consid-
ered14.
• Intensity of competition and product differentiation = Λ and σ
So as to control for different market features, I control for popu-
lation density, [DENS], measuring thousands of people per Km2.
The higher the density, the lower the number of banks: comparing
two submarkets with the same number of inhabitants, I expect that
the number of branches will be less in the submarket with a high
population density.
To measure the intensity of competition and product differentiation,
I computed three indices:
- [K] = Totalbranches/Km2. It represents the monopolistic power
of each branch and could be considered as a proxy of the (inverse of)
transportation costs. More branches in the same provinces means,
for each consumer, a lower distance to cover to reach a branch, a
weaker power exerted by bank branch and an overall higher degree
of competition.
- [P ] = Totalbranches/Population. It is the number of branches for
a thousand inhabitants. The higher P, the higher the competition.
It can be considered as a proxy for the (inverse of) queueing costs.
The less the population served by each branch (or the higher the
number of branches for each individual), the lower the cost met by
the customers15.
- [CV ] =standarddeviation/Branchesmean. It is the coefficient
of variation. It is a dimensionless number and it is calculated by
dividing the standard deviation by the mean of branches in each
14Since data on GDP for the year 2005 was not available,in the analysis I used the
percentage of value added pertaining to each province for year 2004. The relative
position of each province is unlikely to markedly change from one year to another.
Regarding data on population for the year 2005 I relied on Istat forecasting at http:
//demo.istat.it/stimarapida/
15It is interesting to note that these two indices, K and P , split the information
contained in the density of population, DENS = population/Km2
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province. The higher the CV, the higher the degree of differentiation
by branches opening, since some bank has smaller branch network
size whereas others have greater branch network size.
• Market Borders
Since the unit of observation is the bank (or group of banks), I also
compute for each bank in every submarket (province)
- the total number of its own branches [NB_OWNim ]
- the total number of branches of its competitors [NB_COMPim ]
The same quantities are also computed for all the ‘closest’ provinces
(less than 100 Km) [NB_OWN_OUTim ] and [NB_COMP_OUTim ]16.
1.9 Intensity of competition and concentra-
tion: Empirical model and results
According to Sutton’s model, the number of branches per submarket is a
function of the relative size of the submarket, of the intensity of compe-
tition and of the cost incurred to entry. As market size increases, profits
also increase, and given free entry, other firms will enter the market until
the last entrant just covers the exogenous cost of entry. As the previous
analysis also showed, the relationship between the number of firms (or
concentration) and the market size will in general depend on the intensity
of competition and the degree of product differentiation.
The Italian Antitrust Authority defines the province as the relevant
market. Prior to analyse the relationship between the one-bank firm con-
centration ratio and market size, this hypothesis is tested.
16I performed an alternative analysis computing the number of branches of each bank,
and those of its competitors, outside the province but in the same region. The reason for
trying this specification is to test the alternative regional dimension for market size that
is, in general, used by the authorities or in similar studies. The results are substantially
analogous.
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1.10 Model description: identifying the size
of the submarket
In order to test the submarket dimension, I construct a model for the num-
ber of competitors in each province. Given the data, no observations are
possible for provinces with zero banks, since a criterion for sample inclusion
is that there is at least one banks in the province. This is to be distin-
guished from datasets without 0 values, but which may have 0s. Thus, the
dependent variable of the model, the number of banks in each province, is
truncated at zero, taking only positive values. A zero-truncated Poisson
and Negative Binomial models are therefore appropriate, since these mod-
els allows us to take into account that the dependent variable, NFIRMS,
is also a non negative-integer. The truncated densities of these models are
easily obtainable by slightly modifying the untruncated models and have
been presented in Cameron and Trivedi (1998), Gurmu and Trivedi (1992)
and Gurmu (1991).
The latent variable, NFIRMS∗, is assumed to be
NFIRMS∗im = X
′
imδ + eim (1.11)
where m = 1...99 is the submarket, im is bank i in submarket m,
Xim ≡ (NB_OWNim , NB_COMPim , NB_OWN_OUTim ,
NB_COMP_OUTim , CVm, Pm,Km, V Am_pct)
and
NFIRMSim = NFIRMS
∗
im if NFIRMS
∗
im > 0 (1.12)
Since not all of the 573 banks (or group of banks) are active in ev-
ery province, the subscript im goes, for each m, from Nm−1 + 1 to Nm,
where the total numbers of banks, Nm = Nm−1 + nm, gets incremented
by nm, the total number of banks in each province and N0 = 0. The
overall sample size, n1 + .... + n99, is equal to 2673. Observations may
be considered independent across provinces (clusters), but not necessarily
within groups. Cluster devices must be adopted. The number of bank
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branches in each province, NB_OWNim is likely to vary with the level
of demand. Therefore, it is reasonable in the estimation to control for
the level of demand, represented by GDP, [V Am_pct], and the population
spread, [DENSm]. Furthermore, to account for different intensity of com-
petition in the province, I computed two indices of competition, Km and
Pm
17. Then, to take into account the border of submarkets, I consider
the number of branches of each bank in each province [NB_OWNim ] and
outside the province [NB_OWN_OUTim ], and the number of branches
of ‘other banks’, distinguishing them between competitors’ bank branches
in the same provinces [NB_COMPim ] and competitors’ bank branches
outside the provinces [NB_COMP_OUTim ]18. The degree of product
differentiation is captured by the coefficient of variation, [CVm], that mea-
sures how banks are differentiated in terms of total size of their network of
branches inside each province. For the Poisson model the probability that
there are exactly N firms in the market, conditional on N being greater
than zero, is
Prob(NFIRMSim = N |N > 0) =
e−γimγNim
N !(1− eγim ) , (1.13)
for N = 1, ......,∞ and γim = exp(δXim).
Unlike the Poisson distribution, the zero-truncated Poisson distribu-
tion does not present equidispersion (that is, the equality between the
conditional mean and variance). In fact, the average of the truncated dis-
tribution is higher than the average of non-truncated distribution while its
variance is smaller. In addition, contrary to the non-truncated case (As-
plund and Sandin (1999)), the estimates of the regression parameters will
be biased and inconsistent in the presence of overdispersion because consis-
tency requires the proper specification of all the moments of the underlying
relevant cumulative distribution. These findings are similar to the result
that the Tobit estimator, unlike ordinary least squares, yields inconsistent
parameter estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity (See Grogger and
Carson (1992)). Given the importance of accounting for overdispersion in
17See section 4.
18Please see note 14.
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the truncated context, I also present a model for truncated counts based
on the Negative Binomial distribution. The conditional distribution of a
truncated Negative Binomial is
Prob(NFIRMSim = N |N > 0) =
Γ(N + 1α )
Γ(N + 1)Γ 1α
∗ 1
(1 + αγ)
1
α − 1
∗( αγ
1 + αγ
)N ,
(1.14)
As for the Poisson distribution, the average of the truncated negative bino-
mial distribution is higher than that of the non-truncated one. Though the
truncated Poisson distribution no longer shows the equidispersion charac-
teristic, the truncated Negative Poisson model introduce overdispersion,
in the sense that its variance is higher than that of the Poisson19.
1.11 Model description: testing market size-
market concentration relationship
In practice the relationship between market size and market concentration
has been investigated by estimating a lower bound where a concentration
measure is regressed on market size variables. In that case,
log(
C1
1− C1 ) = a+ b
1
log(S/)
+ v (1.15)
The constant represents the value of the limiting concentration as the
market size approaches infinite, that is C∞ = exp(a)/1 + exp(a). The
most used approach is the Smith’s two step procedure, where the error
distribution is a two or three parameters assumed to be drawn from a
Weibull distribution. See for example Marìn and Siotis (2007). Lyons and
19For the truncated Poisson distribution the first and the second moment are:
• E(N |N > 0;X) = u = λ+ σ
• V (N |N > 0;X) = σ2 = λ− σ(u− 1)
with σ = λ/(eλ − 1). The mean and the variance of the truncated negative binomial
regression are the following:
• E(N |N > 0;X) = u∗ = λ+ σ∗
• V (N |N > 0;X) = σ∗2 = λ+ αλ− σ∗(u∗ − 1)
with σ∗ = λ/((1 + α)α−1λ − 1).
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Matraves (1996) proposed to use a stochastic (cost) frontier approach,
allowing for disequilibrium deviations from the bound. As estimating a
stochastic lower bound by maximum likelihood methods is possible only
when the least squares residuals are positively skewed, Symeodonis (2000)
suggest to simply use OLS regressions. I will follow Giorgetti (2003) relying
on quantile regression, as estimations obtained with this procedure are
robust to outliers. In particular, I will estimate the following lower bound
log(
C1
1− C1 ) = a+ a1TY PE1 + a2TY PE2 + a3REGION1 (1.16)
+a4REGION2 + b 1log(S/) + v
where TYPE and REGION are dummies variables, which account for dif-
ferent macro regions in which the Italian territory can be divided and for
the different type of banks. For example, the limiting concentration ratio
in a province in the NORTH, where the major bank is a cooperative, will
be equal to C∞ = exp(a+ a1 + a3)/1 + exp(a+ a1 + a3).
1.12 Results
The results of the zero truncated Poisson are reported in table (2). These
results suggest that province could be considered - in general - as an in-
dependent submarket. As expected, the value of the coefficient is higher
for branches in the same provinces [NB_OWNim ] and [NB_COMPim ],
and lower and close to zero for banks outside [NB_COMP_OUTim ]. Re-
gression in column 2 and 3 in table (2) replicate the analysis in column 1 ac-
counting for i) different macro-regions (REGION1=Nord,REGION2=Centre,
REGION3=South) in which it is possible to group provinces, and ii) dif-
ferent types of banks (TY PE1=BCC, TY PE2=BP, TY PE3= S.p.A).
The inclusions of these variables improve the explanatory power of the
model (likelihood ratio tests are significant). In particular, supporting the
point of independence among provincial submarkets, we can accept the
null hypothesis that both the coefficients of branches belonging to banks
outside the province are zero. The sign for the K coefficient is negative and
significant whereas the value of the P coefficient is smaller, positive and
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significant. These results suggest, as one could expect, that transportation
costs are more relevant in the retail market, and, therefore, a higher branch
density increases competition lowering the expected (ex-post) number of
banks. The value of the coefficient on CV is positive and significant. In ac-
cordance with the model developed in the previous section, the higher the
degree of differentiation, the higher the number of banks. Since consumers
have preferences about total number of branches, some banks have greater
network size with respect to other competitors and are able to capture
more consumers by differentiating themselves by opening more branches.
In equilibrium, therefore, higher asymmetry in branch size (a higher value
of CV) is compatible with a large number of banks. On the contrary, the
sign of the coefficient for the density of population is significant with unex-
pected signs, whereGPD is positive and insignificant. This is probably due
to the non-linear relationship between these variables and the dependent
variable, and to the fact that higher density will capture the same effect
of GDP (since higher density is associated with higher GDP ). Results
for the zero Truncated Negative Binomial are reported in table (3). These
regressions are in line with those of the zero Truncated Poisson. How-
ever, our interest lies in measuring the change in the conditional mean of
NBANKS when regressors X change by one unit, the so called marginal
effects20. For reporting purposes, in tables (4) a single response value - the
mean of the independent variables - is used to evaluate the marginal effects
for regression 3 in table (2) and (3). At this point it is important to con-
trol for overdispersion, since in context with truncation and censoring it
leads to problems of inconsistency (Hilbe (2007)). Several test procedures
can be followed to test the (truncated and untruncated) Poisson model
against the Negative Binomial model. As the Negative Binomial model
degenerate into a Poisson model when α = 0, all tests (score test, Wald
test, likelihood test) are based on testing the overdispersion parameter α
equal to zero (Yen and Adamowicz (1993)). Since both the Poisson and
the Negative Binomial model have been estimated a likelihood-ratio test
20For linear regression marginal effects coincide with the estimated coefficients. For
non linear regression this is no longer true. In that case, E[NBANKS|X] = exp(X′β),
then ∂E[NBANKS|X]/∂X = exp(X′β)β is a function of both estimated parameters
and regressors.
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is straightforward. From the previous tables, it is possible to compute the
likelihood-ratio test of α = 0. This is the likelihood-ratio chi-square test
that is equal to χ2(1) = −2(ll(Poisson)−ll(NegativeBinomial)). The large
test statistic would suggest that the response variable is over-dispersed and
it is not sufficiently described by the Poisson distribution. In all cases, this
test is significant (for example, for regressions (3) is equal to χ2(1) = 357.26,
p < 0.001). In the end, these preliminary analysis allows me to analyse the
main relationship of interest, that is the one between the size of the market
and the one-firm concentration ratio at the provincial level, relying only on
a subsample made of one observation for each submarket. I will measure
market size by means of two variables: the population in each province
and the number of banks as estimated in previous section. Concerning the
choice of this latter variables, it important to notice that in homogeneous
industries, the number of firms represents the ratio between market size
and sunk costs, that is S/ . In addition, I can rely on 99 submarkets
instead of 103 since four provinces has been excluded from the previous
regressions as were considered isolated by definition. Tables (5) and (6)
report quantile regressions for the fifth, tenth and fiftieth percentile. The
results are very similar and support the hypothesis that the retail banking
industry is characterized by exogenous sunk costs: the estimated limiting
concentration C∞, approaches zero as the market size approaches infinite.
It would be better to have an industry with endogenous costs so as to
compare the value of the limiting concentration. However, the quantile re-
gressions, using both measures of market size, indicate that when market
size increases, the concentration index goes down. This result is weaker in
provinces located in the South and in the Centre whereas it is stronger in
province where the main banks is a TYPE2 (that is, Banche Popolari).
1.13 Robustness checks
The aim of this section is to control for issues that could weaken previous
results, mainly endogeneity and model specifications. Endogeneity may be
an important concern when testing the size of each submarket, since there
are variables that could be considered jointly determined with the number
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of banks if the industry has not reached an equilibrium. In particular, at
firm level, a troubling variable could be the number of branches a bank
has in the province (NB_OWN). The easiest way to test for endogene-
ity is to use a method suggested by Wooldridge (1997) for count models
with endogenous explanatory variables along similar lines to those sug-
gested in other limited dependent variable contexts by Smith and Blundell
(1986) and Rivers and Voung (1988). For any given explanatory variable x
which is potentially endogenous, it is possible to estimate a reduced form
regression of the form
x = z′pi + v (1.17)
where z represents a vector of exogenous explanatory variables including
at least one not included in x for identification, pi the vector of reduced
form coefficients and v is the reduced form error term. If it is possible
to obtain consistent estimates of pi, Wooldrige shows that the residuals
vˆ = x − z′pˆi can be included as an additional covariate in a maximum
likelihood estimator for count data model. A significant coefficient on vˆ in
the augmented regression is a robust test of endogeneity of x. I test for
possible endogeneity of NB_OWN using as an identifying instrument the
same variable in year t− 2. The reason to choose NB_OWNt−2 instead
of in year NB_OWNt−1 is to avoid the risk of unit root. The reduced
form is presented in table (7), whereas the residuals from this regression
are then used as an additional covariate in the zero truncated Negative
Binomial regression in table (8). The coefficient of the residuals is not sig-
nificant, suggesting that in year 2005 the Italian Banking industry reached
an equilibrium. To analogous (not reported) conclusions leads a test for
endogeneity of NB_OWN and NB_COMP . Another concern is related
to the specification on the model for the relationship between market size
and the one firm concentration ratio. A better alternative to estimate a
model where the dependent variable is a proportion is to use generalized
linear models (Papke and Wooldridge (1996)). Results reported in table
(9) confirm those obtained by means of standard regression model .
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1.14 Conclusions
The aim of this work was to test Sutton model of independent submar-
kets checking his predictions for the Italian retail banking industry and
using the framework for the exogenous sunk costs industries. Even though
the banking industry as a whole should be considered as characterized by
endogenous sunk costs, there are several features that indicate the retail
industry to be one of the former type. In particular, as banks branches sell
slightly differentiated products in the retail sector, it is possible to look
at the number of banks branches as different varieties of the same prod-
uct offered by banks to their client. In addition, despite the advances of
the phone banking, consumers’ preferences are still biased toward regional
entity, suggesting province as submarket dimension.
The model developed in the first part of the paper indicates which
factors should influence the number of banks in each submarket, and as a
consequence the one firm concentration ratio: the initial number of banks,
the intensity of competition and the degree of product differentiation.
In the second part, a truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial model
have been used in order to estimate the number of banks in each submarket.
This way of proceeding allowed me to check the hypothesis about the
size and the independence among submarkets. In fact, the value of the
coefficient on the number of branches for banks outside the provinces, but
within a radius of a hundred of kilometers, turned out to be insignificant.
These results permitted to examine the one bank concentration ratio at
provincial level. Interestingly, the limiting concentration ratio approaches
zero as market size goes to infinity. That means that exogenous sunk costs
are involved in the Italian retail banking industry. As argued by Sutton,
as the dimension of the submarket becomes larger, and given free entry,
the value of concentration ratio has to go down.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Nbanks 34.598 19.096 8 86 2673
C1 24.869 8.153 12.963 80.672 2673
CV 1.626 0.419 0.691 2.648 2673
DENS 0.033 0.044 0.004 0.264 2673
K 0.002 0.002 0 0.012 2673
P 0.06 0.019 0.022 0.104 2673
NB_OWN 0.001 0.002 0 0.043 2673
NB_COMP 0.045 0.048 0.002 0.231 2673
NB_OWN_OUT 0.005 0.01 0 0.093 2673
NB_COMP_OUT 0.177 0.156 0.002 0.631 2673
Table 2: Estimation results: Zero Truncated Poisson
Dependent variable: Numbers of Banks - equation (3.3)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
NB_OWN 9.242*** 9.080*** 9.043***
(2.062) (1.967) (1.744)
NB_COMP 8.190*** 8.482*** 8.404***
(1.344) (1.242) (1.204)
NB_OWN_OUT -2.699*** -2.122*** -0.874
(0.623) (0.566) (0.594)
NB_COMP_OUT -0.049 0.004 -0.011
(0.182) (0.216) (0.205)
CV 0.167 0.228 0.231*
(0.151) (0.140) (0.134)
K -141.197*** -126.401*** -124.354***
(48.777) (41.179) (39.865)
P 9.768*** 12.335*** 11.658***
(2.876) (2.900) (2.737)
DENS 3.859*** 3.163*** 3.135***
(1.322) (1.105) (1.065)
VA_pct 1.627 0.572 0.677
(2.158) (1.741) (1.675)
REGIONE1 -0.204* -0.198
(0.123) (0.121)
REGIONE2 -0.248** -0.229*
(0.123) (0.118)
TYPE1 0.106***
(0.031)
TYPE2 0.032***
(0.012)
Constant 2.338*** 2.237*** 2.231***
(0.219) (0.200) (0.191)
ll -9490.302 -9347.755 -9266.454
N 2673 2673 2673
chi2 1051.747 1067.701 1097.830
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
30
Table 3: Estimation results: Zero Truncated Negative Binomial
Dependent variable: Numbers of Banks
Variable (1) (2) (3)
NB_OWN 9.227*** 8.933*** 9.042***
(2.278) (2.194) (1.890)
NB_COMP 8.564*** 8.615*** 8.527***
(1.428) (1.279) (1.236)
NB_OWN_OUT -2.559*** -2.121*** -0.843
(0.601) (0.562) (0.600)
NB_COMP_OUT -0.032 0.026 0.010
(0.170) (0.206) (0.195)
CV 0.163 0.219 0.222*
(0.142) (0.137) (0.132)
K -141.481*** -124.063*** -121.415***
(48.087) (42.405) (40.864)
P 8.761*** 11.128*** 10.515***
(2.610) (2.885) (2.751)
DENS 3.729*** 3.081*** 3.045***
(1.294) (1.161) (1.115)
VA_pct 1.479 0.557 0.647
(2.352) (1.846) (1.762)
REGIONE1 -0.177 -0.173
(0.124) (0.121)
REGIONE2 -0.209* -0.193
(0.123) (0.118)
TYPE1 0.114***
(0.032)
TYPE2 0.036***
(0.013)
Constant 2.392*** 2.289*** 2.278***
(0.193) (0.189) (0.181)
lnalpha -3.676*** -3.831*** -3.930***
(0.371) (0.425) (0.422)
ll -9196.711 -9138.896 -9087.824
N 2673 2673 2673
chi2 600.999 641.091 657.921
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Estimation results: Marginal effects
Variable (ztp) (ztnb) (Variable Mean)
NB_OWN 283.1834 283.0865 .0011403
(52.357) (56.701)
NB_COMP 263.1779 266.9689 .0447364
(36.787) (38.366)
NB_OWN_OUT -27.37672 -26.40309 .005079
(18.463) (18.601)
NB_COMP_OUT -.3452477 .2979915 .1772281
(6.431) (6.110)
CV 7.227972 6.952858 1.625817
(4.238) (4.167)
K -3894.202 -3801.284 .0018006
(1238.163) (1277.182)
P 365.0903 329.2003 .0600712
(87.430) (87.960)
DENS 98.17784 95.34141 .0327039
(32.976) (34.739)
VA_pct 21.21327 20.25852 .0143725
(52.418) (55.120)
REGIONE1 (d) -6.113763 -5.35278
(3.697) (3.708)
REGIONE2 (d) -6.920037 -5.862967
(3.473) (3.508)
TYPE1 (d) 3.423496 3.673721
(1.037) (1.093)
TYPE2 (d) 1.002621 1.144445
(0.392) (0.417)
(d)marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Table 5: Estimation results: QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
Variable Quantile5% Quantile25% Quantile50%
1/log(POP) 51.416*** 37.429*** 34.027***
(5.967) (12.168) (10.508)
REGIONE1 0.186 0.070 0.005
(0.162) (0.160) (0.107)
REGIONE2 0.253 0.035 -0.025
(0.180) (0.172) (0.114)
TYPE1 -0.041 -0.122 -0.204*
(0.111) (0.179) (0.114)
TYPE2 -0.046 0.094 -0.005
(0.116) (0.200) (0.129)
Constant -5.737*** -4.225*** -3.644***
(0.455) (0.949) (0.817)
C∞ REGION1 0.0039 0.0154 0.0256
(0.0021) (.0144) (0.0205)
C∞ REGION2 0.0041 0.0149 0.0249
(0.0020) (0.0142) (0.0198)
C∞ REGION3 0.00321 (0.0144) 0.0255
(0.0015) (0.0135) (.0203)
N 103 103 103
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
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Table 6: Estimation results: QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
Variable Quantile5% Quantile25% Quantile50%
1/log(banks) 7.556* 7.078 2.947
(4.440) (5.069) (3.001)
REGIONE1 0.428*** 0.232 0.029
(0.099) (0.199) (0.100)
REGIONE2 0.437*** 0.196 -0.022
(0.132) (0.202) (0.102)
TYPE1 0.011 -0.108 -0.198**
(0.186) (0.203) (0.097)
TYPE2 0.057 -0.019 -0.054
(0.089) (0.237) (0.116)
Constant -3.123*** -2.498*** -1.500***
(0.719) (0.818) (0.489)
C∞ REGION1 0.0633 0.0940 0.1824**
(0.0455) (0.0646) (0.0730)
C∞ REGION2 0.0638 0.0909 0.1791***
(0.0441) (0.0655) (0.0679)
C∞ REGION3 0.0422 0.0760 0.1868***
(0.0290) (0.0574) (0.0683)
N 99 99 99
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
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Table 7: Estimation results: OLS - Reduced form
Dependent variable: NB_OWN
Variable Coefficient
NB_OWN_03 0.9798***
(0.008)
NB_COMP 0.0003*
(0.000)
NB_OWN_OUT 0.0002
(0.001)
NB_COMP_OUT 0.0001
(0.000)
CV -0.0000
(0.000)
K -0.0025
(0.009)
P 0.0002
(0.000)
DENS 0.0002
(0.000)
VA_pct 0.0003
(0.000)
TYPE1 0.0000
(0.000)
TYPE2 0.0001***
(0.000)
REGION1 -0.0000
(0.000)
REGION2 0.0000
(0.000)
Constant 0.0000
(0.000)
R2 .9883225
N 2414.000
p 0.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Estimation results: Augmented Zero Truncated Negative Bino-
mial
Dependent variable: Numbers of Banks
Variable (1)
NB_OWN 9.170***
(1.923)
NB_COMP 8.556***
(1.255)
NB_OWN_OUT -0.591
(0.587)
NB_COMP_OUT 0.006
(0.203)
CV 0.225*
(0.135)
K -121.924***
(41.176)
P 10.713***
(2.718)
DENS 3.087***
(1.128)
VA_pct 0.613
(1.770)
TYPE1 0.121***
(0.032)
TYPE2 0.034**
(0.014)
REGION1 -0.181
(0.124)
REGION2 -0.201*
(0.120)
vhat -2.433
(8.790)
Constant 2.260***
(0.186)
-3.852***
(0.404)
ll -8245.051
N 2414.000
chi2 666.529
p 0.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Estimation results: GLM
As the dependent variable C1 is a proportion, it is to use generalized linear model
with family binomial family, logistic link function. Standard errors scaled using
square root of Pearson X2-based dispersion
Variable
1/log(POP) 43.956***
(12.273)
REGIONE1 -0.173 -0.145
(0.117) (0.136)
REGIONE2 -0.227* -0.188
(0.124) (0.139)
TYPE1 -0.234* -0.263*
(0.132) (0.138)
TYPE2 0.040 -0.088
(0.145) (0.160)
1/log(banks) -0.848
(4.023)
Constant -4.221*** -0.686
(0.957) (0.656)
C∞ REGION1 0.0122 0.3034**
(.0115 ) ( 0.1256)
C∞ REGION2 0.0116 0.2943**
(0.1098) (0.1283)
C∞ REGION3 0.01450 0.3349**
(0.0144) (0.1462)
N 103 99
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
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Chapter 2
Unit Roots and the
Dynamics of Market
Shares: an analysis using
Italian Banking
micro-panel
Abstract
The paper proposes the use of panel data unit root tests to assess market
share instability in order to have (preliminary) indications of the industry
dynamic. The idea is to consider the movements in market shares not
only as element of the market structure but rather reflecting competitors’
conduct. If shares are mean-reverting, the firm actions have a temporary
effect on shares only. On the other hand, if they are evolving, as signaled by
the presence of unit roots, the gain in shares respect with the competitors
could be long-term. To illustrate the potential of unit roots tests, I consider
an application to the Italian retail banking industry.
Keywords: turbulence, cross-section dependence.
JEL Classification: C23; D40.
2.1 Introduction
In order to get an understanding of the dynamic of an industry, a first step
could be to examine whether the market shares are stationary or evolving.
If shares are mean-reverting, the firm actions only have a temporary effect
on shares. On the contrary, if they are evolving, as signaled by the presence
of unit roots, the gain (or loss) in shares respect with the competitors could
be long-term. In the first case, it is reasonable to infer that the industry
is rather stable - or mature - where actors reached positions difficult to
overcome. In the second case, instead, the possibility for a competitor to
become permanently a leader (or to loose the leadership) could be a signal
that the industry experienced the displacement of existing technology by
alternative ones and/or the displacement of existing products by new and
superior substitutes. In other words, by considering the movements in
market shares not only as elements of the market structure but rather
reflecting competitors’ conduct that arise from the market (Asplund and
Nocke (2006); Caves (1998); Matraves and Rondi (2007); Sutton (2004);
Uchida and Cook (2005)), unit root tests could be a way to empirically
test the influence of industry characteristics on the degree of turbulence
(Davies and Geroski (1997); Sutton (1997)).
An important characteristic of market share data sets is the logical
consistency requirement in market share models. In fact, market shares
are bounded between 0 and 1 and they sum to unity. This relationship
must be taken into account if one want to study all the actors in the
market1. Another possibility is to consider only few actors in the market.
According to this latter procedure, this paper proposes the use of micro-
panel data unit root models to assess market share instability in the Italian
Banking Industry for a sample of firms made of the first 5 banks in each
province. On the one hand, the assessment of the competitive conditions
of the Italian banking industry is of interest since the industry has known
a marked consolidation process along with a remarkable deregulation pro-
1An interesting approach is presented in the work of Franses et al. (2001). They
exploit the consistency requirement to apply the Johansen test, relying on a system-
based test rather than a single equation test. In addition, the fact that the data are
bounded from below and above renders a deterministic model implausible.
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cess since the beginning of the nineties. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the first to apply this methodology to test banking competition.
On the other hand, given the well-known low power of conventional unit
root tests when applied to single short time series, panel unit root tests
can be fruitfully employed in analysis of firms or industries that rely on
micro-panels, where the time dimension may be of limited length but ob-
served across several units. One of the main advantages of panel unit root
tests is that their asymptotic distribution is standard normal. This is in
contrast to individual time series unit roots which are non-standard nor-
mal asymptotic distributions. However, these tests are not exempt from
critics. In particular, few tests consider the possibility of cross-section
correlation and spillovers amongst countries, regions or provinces (Baltagi
et al. (2007)). In this regard, Pesaran (2004) suggests a test for cross-
sectional dependence and way of getting rid of it by augmenting the usual
ADF regression with lagged cross-sectional mean and its first-difference to
capture the cross-sectional dependence that arises through a single factor
model. Other important aspects concerning panel unit roots are related
to their asymptotic behavior under the two dimension of the panel, N and
T and their requirement for a balanced panel (no missing data for any i
not t).
Clearly, the use of panel unit root tests can only offer (preliminary)
indications of the dynamic in the industry. As any other statistical test,
there is a risk of incorrect inference but it could be minimized by prop-
erly selecting the test in relation to the main features of the dataset used.
In any case, results must be supported by other qualitative - and if it is
feasible - quantitative evidence. However, the existence of dynamic in the
positions of the first 5 banks - as signalled by the presence of unit roots
in the market shares - suggests that the Italian retail banking industry
experienced overtime a movement towards higher level of competition. In
particular, in the same spirit of Kim et al. (2003), a dynamic in market
shares could be interpreted as an indirect signal for a reduction of switch-
ing costs that make easier to consumers to move to different banks and,
consequently, for banks to acquire new customers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly intro-
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duces the data and the main features of the industry under investigation.
Section 3 presents the model for micro-panels, whereas in section 4 panel
unit roots tests are computed for the first 5 banks in every Italian province.
Section 5 provides the Pesaran’s test of cross-section dependence. The fol-
lowing section, taking into account these results, computes the unit root
test proposed by Pesaran which deals with the cross-section dependence.
The conclusions are presented in the final section.
2.2 Characteristics and construction of the
dataset
A peculiarity of the Italian banking industry is the presence of different ter-
ritorial dynamics (Colombo and Turati (2004); Guiso et al. (2004, 2006)).
In particular, the retail Italian Banking Industry can be viewed as made
of a large number of local markets corresponding to different geographical
locations. In each one of these submarkets, there are several branches of
different banks competing against each other. The Italian territory is di-
vided into 20 regions and 103 provinces, which are geographical units close
to US counties. In accordance with the Italian Antitrust Authority, the
presumption is that the province is the relevant market.
Given the widespread differences in local economic conditions and their
influence on the competition process, I will focus on local markets by mea-
suring market shares at the provincial level using data on branches as
proxies for the market share of individual (or group of) banks. The rea-
sons behind the choice to compute market shares relying on this variable
are various. First of all, the number of branches (or branch density) is
commonly used in the empirical literature on local banking competition
(see, for instance, Degryse and Ongena (2005)). Secondly, it captures the
dimension of banking competition that has been more heavily affected by
the deregulation process. Since March 1990, the establishment of new
branches has been completely liberalized. The number of branches in-
creased steadily, up to 32.337 in 2007, as well as the number of people
served by each branch, 47 per 100.000 inhabitants in 2004 (compared to
3
59 EU mean)2. In addition, this measure is made freely available, without
any break, for a long period of time by the Italian Central Bank (Banca
d’Italia) 3.
Hence, the (unbalanced) dataset is composed of 103 Italian provinces.
For each province I computed the market shares for the first 5 individual
banks (or group of banks) from the year 1993 to 2006. The majority of
Italian banks do not belong to any groups.
Table 1: Market Share Summary statistics
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
1993 0.136 0.11 0.017 0.707
1994 0.136 0.11 0.016 0.683
1995 0.138 0.107 0.016 0.672
1996 0.137 0.105 0.016 0.646
1997 0.138 0.106 0.023 0.643
1998 0.140 0.112 0.023 0.849
1999 0.145 0.111 0.025 0.843
2000 0.143 0.108 0.024 0.836
2001 0.139 0.102 0.024 0.829
2002 0.139 0.1 0.024 0.807
2003 0.137 0.099 0.024 0.808
2004 0.135 0.098 0.024 0.808
2005 0.133 0.095 0.024 0.807
2006 0.131 0.093 0.025 0.802
N 515
In this work, the unit of observation is the bank (or group of banks)
in each province and year. This means that I treat the share of the same
banks (or group of banks) in a different province as pertaining to a different
bank. In order to consider the dynamics at (higher) regional level, tests will
also be performed by grouping the different provinces according to different
2Beginning in the 1980s, the Italian Banking system underwent a series of reforms
aimed at increasing the competition in the market through liberalizing branching and
easing the geographical restrictions on lending. In fact, the opening of new branches
had been regulated by the branch distribution plan, issued every four years. The last
distribution plan was issued in 1986.
3http://siotec.bancaditalia.it/sportelli/main.do?function=language\
&language=ita.
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macro-region: North, Centre and South. As Guiso et al. (2004, 2006)
showed, while there is a considerable variation in the degree of banking
competition across local markets, the North-Centre/South divide is a clear
feature of the Italian banking Industry.
Table (1) and (2) report the summary statistics of the market share
of the first five banks in the sample. A closer look at these tables seem
to reveal a stable pattern over time and the North-Centre/South divide.
However, they may indicate little since there might be an intensive switch-
ing among banks’ positions and a greater variability at local level. The
challenge of the proposed methodology is to find out the underlying dy-
namic of banks at provincial level.
Table 2: Market Share Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
NATIONAL 0.138 0.104 0.016 0.849 7210
NORTH 0.135 0.092 0.016 0.525 2590
CENTRE 0.14 0.102 0.026 0.548 2100
SOUTH 0.138 0.117 0.024 0.849 2520
North: Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Trentino
Alto-Adige,Veneto
Centre:Emilia Romagna, Lazio, Marche, Toscana, Umbria
South: Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia
2.3 Tests for unit roots: the model
In this paper I consider micro-panel data models where the cross-section
dimension is much larger than the time series dimension. Reviews of the
literature on dynamic micro-panels are provided in Baltagi (2005) and
Arellano (2003). For a general survey of the literature about unit root
tests see Breitung and Pesaran (2006).
Let sit be the market share of bank i in period t in each province.
The model could be represented by a dynamic AR(1) panel data model
allowing for heterogeneity in the intercept but not in the autoregressive
parameter
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si0 = δ0 + δ1ηi + vi0
sit = αisi,t−1 + uit
uit = (1− αi)ηi + vit (2.1)
where α1 = · · · = αN = α for each i = 1 . . . N , t = 2 . . . T , and where
N is large and T is fixed. The series have a unit root (or are integrated of
order one) if αi = 1 and are stationary if αi < 1. A test for the presence
of a unit root in the panel is presented by the null hypothesis H0 : α = 1
in equation (2.1).
In case of independence across firms, the error term satisfies
E(ηi) = 0, E(vit) = 0 (2.2)
for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 2, . . . , T and
E(vitvis) = 0 (2.3)
for i = 1, . . . , N and t 6= s.
In the literature two types of panel unit root tests can be distinguished,
dependent on the alternative under consideration. The first type of test
considers a homogeneous alternative, i.e H0 = α1 = · · · = αN = α < 1.
An example is Levin et al. (2002). The idea of this approach is to perform
a pooled Dickey-Fuller (DF ) test with the residuals. The second type of
test allow for heterogeneity of all parameters. Im et al. (2003) criticize
the assumption of common root under the alternative and they require
|αi| < 1 for a sufficiently large number of units. Consequently in this case,
it is natural to perform N tests individually and to average over individual
DF statistics.
In that model there are two sources of persistency. One is the autore-
gressive mechanism, which is the same for all cross-section units, and the
other is the unobserved individual-specific term. The unit root hypothesis
can be considered as an extreme case where all the presistency is caused by
the autoregressive mechanism. In this context, the time dimension of the
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panel dataset is an important issue to look at, as well as the specification
of the initial value.
In this paper, two distinct regression-based test procedures will be pro-
posed: one based on a simple OLS regression of market shares on their
lagged values; the second test, proposed by Breitung and Meyer (1994),
specifies the regression in terms of deviations from initial conditions and
it is therefore more powerful if the variance of individual effects is high.
These simple t-tests based on least-squared estimators, which are consis-
tent only under the unit root null, are shown to have good size properties
and at least as high power as test based on GMM and ML estimators
(Bond et al. (2005)). It is known that instrumental variable and GMM
procedures provide consistent estimate of dynamic coefficients in cases
where pooled least squares are inconsistent (Arellano (2003), Phillips and
Sul (2007)). However, these procedures are also known to suffer bias and
weak instrumentation problem when the dynamic coefficient αi is close to
unity.
However, these tests are not exempt from critics. In particular, they
assume cross-section independence. Hence, the Pesaran’s test for cross-
section independence will be computed. The test can in fact be applied to a
wide range of panel data model, including panel with short time dimension.
As that test evidenced the presence of cross-section dependence, the panel
unit root test allowing for cross-section dependence proposed by Pesaran
will be also computed.
2.3.1 OLS
As Bond et al. (2005); Madsen (2003); Hall (2002) have shown, the t-
test based on the OLS levels estimator performs much better than other
estimators (GMM, FD, WG,..) in micro panels, that is when T is very
small in comparison with N . Both simulation and asymptotic analysis
have demonstrated that the OLS estimator has the highest power to reject
alternative that are close to the null hypothesis that α = 1.
Because the number of periods is small, properties of the initial con-
dition are also relevant. Madsen (2003) shows that the asymptotic power
of the OLS test under the alternative differs depending on the assumption
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made about the initial value. In particular, the advantage of using OLS
is expected to be high when the initial value are such that the time-series
process become covariance stationary, even for value of α close to unity4.
In the other cases, when the initial values are such that the time-series
become mean stationary and when the variation in the individual-specific
terms is high, the highest power can be obtained using a t-test for the
least squares estimator in the transformed model proposed by Breitung
and Meyer (1994). As emerged from the previous works, these two tests
must be considered jointly.
Under the null H0 : α = 1, the OLS estimator of α in model 2.1 is
consistent. The t-test based on OLS estimator is
tOLS =
αˆOLS − 1√
ˆV ar(αˆOLS)
(2.4)
where
ˆV ar(αˆOLS) = (s′−1s−1)
−1
(
N∑
i
s′i,−1eie
′
isi,−1
)
(s′−1s−1)
−1 (2.5)
with ei = si−si,1αˆOLS , si = (si,2, . . . , si,T )′, si,−1 = (si,1, . . . , si,T−1)′,
and s−1 = (s′1,−1, . . . , s′N,−1)′. Under the null, α = 1, tOLS has an asymp-
totic standard normal distribution as N →∞.
Under the alternative, the OLS estimator is biased upwards, more so
when the variance of ηit is large relative to the variance of vit. The power
of this test will therefore depend on the magnitude of V ar(ηi)/V ar(vit)
(Bond et al. (2005)).
Breitung and Meyer (1994) suggest an alternative estimation approach
which involves deducting the first observation si0 for each firm from the
right hand side of equation (2.1). The estimable model becomes
sit − si0 = α(si,t−1 − si,0) + it (2.6)
s˜t = s˜t−1 + it t = 3, . . . , T (2.7)
4Mean stationarity (constant first moment) requires αi < 1 and δ0 = 0 and δ1 = 1.
The covariance stationarity (constant first and second moments) in addition requires
homeschedatisticity over time of the vit shocks (i.e. var(vit) = σ2vi for i = 1, . . . , N)
and that var(vi0) = σvi/(1− αi)2.
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where  = vit−(1−α)(si0−ηi). Again, the OLS estimator is consistent
when α = 1 and upward biased under the alternative. Breitung and Meyer
however showed that the bias is α + 1−α2 . That means that the power of
the test, contrary to the previous case, is not affected by the individual-
specific term, that is by the term V ar(ηi)V ar(vit) . For long T panels, none of these
could be applied, since the asymptotic distribution tends to a DF: so it is
necessary to combine N DF/ADF tests as in Im et al. (2003).
2.3.2 A test for Cross Section Dependence
Pesaran (2004), Baltagi et al. (2007) show that there can be considerable
size distortions in panel when the hypothesis of cross section independence
is violated and the specification exhibits, for example, spatial error corre-
lation.
When N is small and the time dimension T is sufficiently large, the
cross section correlation can be modeled using seemingly unrelated regres-
sion (SURE), and traditional times series techniques - such the Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) of Breusch and Pagan - can be applied5. However in
cases where N is large, standard techniques are not applicable. Another
approach, used in the literature of spatial statistics, measures the extent
of cross dependence by means of a spatial matrix.
Pesaran (2004) proposes instead a simple diagnostic test that neither
requires any a priori specification of a connection matrix nor suffers of
panel data model limitations. It is therefore applicable in a variety of con-
texts, including stationarity dynamic and unit-root heterogeneous panels
with short T and large N . The test, in all its various formulation, is based
on simple averages of pair-wise correlation coefficients of OLS residuals
from individual regressions.
5For example, Chu et al. (2007) used the panel SURADF tests to investigate Gibrat’s
law of proportionate effects for 48 electronic firms in Taiwan. Panel SURADF tests han-
dle cross-sectional dependence across firms and, at the same time, investigate a separate
unit-root null hypothesis for each and every individual panel member, identifying how
many and which series in the panel are stationary process
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CD =
√
2T
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρˆij
 (2.8)
where
ρˆij =
∑T
t=1 vˆitvˆjt(∑T
t=1 vˆit
2
)1/2 (∑T
t=1 vˆjt
2
)1/2 (2.9)
Unlike the LM statistic, the CD statistic has exactly mean at zero for
fixed value of T and N , under a wider range of panel data model, and it
is shown to have a standard normal distribution, assuming that the errors
are symmetrically distributed, vit are i.i.d.(0, 1). In addition, it can be
applied to unbalanced panels. In this last case, equation (2.10) can be
modified by
CD =
√
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
√
Tij ρˆij
 (2.10)
where Tij =
∑
1Ti∩Tj (the number of common time series observations
between units i and j) and
ρˆij =
∑
t∈Tij (vˆit − ¯ˆvit)(vˆjt − ¯ˆvjt)(∑T
t=1(vˆit − ¯ˆvit)2
)1/2 (∑T
t=1(vˆjt − ¯ˆvjt))2
)1/2 (2.11)
with ¯ˆvit =
∑
t∈Tij uˆij/Tij . Finally, in cases where the cross section
units can be ordered a priori, as with spatial observations, the CD test
can be generalized capturing the spatial pattern too (Pesaran (2004)).
2.4 The Italian case
As previously stated, the Italian banking industry is of interest since it ex-
perienced a deregulation process during the nineties that lead, among other
things, to liberalized entry and easier procedures to open new branches.
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Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a movement towards higher level of
competition, both at National and macro-regional level.
Let’s start with the two simple t-tests based on OLS regressions.
Table 3: OLS:
Dependent variable: Firm shares
Variable NATIONAL NORTH CENTRE SOUTH
t* 2.91 3.17 0.65 1.06
p-value 0.004 0.002 0.517 0.290
with time dummies
t* 4.8 6.93 6.2 4.8
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 5758 2086 1695 1977
*Note: the t-statistic for H0: β = 1 against H1 : β < 1
Results relying on constrained estimations - imposing restrictions on the constant
being equal or greater than zero - are substantially identical.
Table 4: Breitung and Meyer 1994:
Dependent variable: Firm shares
Variable NATIONAL NORTH CENTRE SOUTH
t* 3.19 2.5 0.31 2.9
p-value 0.001 0.012 0.750 0.004
N 5758 2086 1695 1977
*Note: the t-statistic for H0: β = 1 against H1: β < 1.
As table (3) and (4) show, the null hypothesisH0 : α = 1 cannot always
be rejected and the series seem to present unit roots, especially in the
market-share related to the provinces in the Centre/South of Italy. These
results disappear when it is controlled for common shocks (captured by
year dummies). If the hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected, it means
that the positions of the main banks in the market could be displaced
permanently by other actors, and there is evidence for a shift towards
higher degree of competition.
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2.4.1 Cross Section Dependence in Dynamics Panels
In the previous section, as it is typically assumed in panel data models,
disturbances are treated as cross sectionally independent. To check if the
panel at hand is characterized by cross-section dependence, the CD test is
applied6. Two specification are used: one with residuals of homogeneous
regression and one with residuals fromN individual regressions from model
(2.1). In both cases, the tests draw also on the residuals of the specifica-
tion with/without the intercept and the observations are grouped again ac-
cording to macro-regional classification (North, Center and South)7. The
correlation are computed over the common set of observations for i and
j. As it is already noted, the OLS estimates of the constant, (1 − αi)ηi,
and slope αi for the individual series are biased when T is small. And
that bias could be substantial for value of α near unity. However, the CD
TEST advanced by Pesaran (2004) is valid for all values of α in model 2.1,
including unity. The main reason lies in the fact that despite the sample
bias of the parameters estimates, the OLS have exactly mean zero even for
a fixed T, so long as the errors are symmetrically distributed. The main
limitation of Pesaran’s test relies in its pair wise construction since it could
be possible that pair wise correlation compensate each others, summing
to zero. While allowing for different value of αi and cross-section correla-
tion, we still assume that in model (2.1) vit are serially uncorrelated with
zero mean. Due to computational reasons, I restrict the analysis to the
balanced panel made of 20% of the observations. Table (5) reports re-
sults for the cross section dependence test developed by Pesaran. In both
cases, allowing or not for heterogeneity, there is evidence for cross section
dependence in all the macro-region considered.
6For this test I built a STATA command csdar.ado relying on xtcsd.ado as developed
by De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006).
7Results in table (5) refer to estimation without intercept. Those with intercept are
analogous and are not reported.
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Table 5: Pesaran’s Test of Cross Section Independence
NATIONAL NORTH CENTRE SOUTH
Residuals
from a regression*
CD Statistic 6.875 50.370 44.920 52.694
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Residuals
from N regression*
CD Statistic 5.106 50.228 44.334 52.864
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* without intercept
2.5 Panel Unit Root Tests for Cross Section-
ally Dependent Panels
Overall, the outcome of the preceding tests clearly indicates the presence
of cross section dependence amongst units.
Pesaran builds on the assumption that the error terms vit of equation
(2.1) follow a single common factor structure
vit = λift + it (2.12)
The common factor is assumed to be stationary and to impact the
cross-section with a fraction determined by the individual specific factor
loading λi. Because of the common factor, cross section dependence arises
and can be approximated by the cross-section mean s¯t = 1N
∑N
i=1 sit. As
usual, the it are assumed to be i.i.d across i and t with zero mean and
variance σ2i , and E(it)4 < ∞. Furthermore, it, ft and λi are mutually
independently distributed for all i.
Pesaran proposes the following augmented Dickey-Fuller regression:
∆sit = ci+ ρisi,t−1+βis¯t−1+
p∑
j=1
γij∆si,t−j +
p∑
j=0
γij∆s¯i,t−j + it (2.13)
where, as usual in the univariate case, lagged first-differences on both si
and s¯i are added in order to take into account also for possible correlation
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in the error term. Either individually or in a combined fashion, the t-value
of ρi can be used to test the presence of unit roots. In the first case,
the statistic is called cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADFi)
while in the second case the statistic is constructed as
CIPS =
1
N
N∑
i
CADFi (2.14)
It is called CIPS since it resembles the IPS statistic (Im et al. (2003)).
In the case were T is fixed, to ensure the CADF statistics do not depend
on the nuisance parameters, Pesaran (2003) suggests to apply the test to
the deviations of the variable from initial cross-section mean.
Table 6: Pesaran’s Test for Unit Root
NATIONAL NORTH CENTRE SOUTH
CADF (0 lag)
t -1.563 -2.020 -2.067 -2.086
z[t-bar] 1.178 -1.309 -2.067 -2.086
P-value 0.881 0.095 0.023 0.084
CADF (1 lag)
t -1.333 -2.708 -1.590 -1.262
z[t-bar] 3.024 -1.560 0.744 1.644
P-value 0.999 0.059 0.772 0.950
Table (6) shows the Pesaran’s test for unit root computed using Ital-
ian Banking dataset. Due to the presence of the lagged level of the cross
sectional average, the limiting distribution of the CADF statistics and the
CIPS statistic does not follow a standard Dickey-Fuller distribution. How-
ever, Peseran provides critical values based on simulations for the CADF
and CIPS-distributions for three cases (no intercept and no trend, intercept
only, intercept and trend). As results from this test suggests, cross-section
dependence does matter. When controlling for it, the series exhibit the
presence of unit roots. That means that there is a dynamic in the positions
of the main competitors in the market, and there exist the possibility for
the main actors to be displaced by competitors. The question to be ad-
dressed now is what are the factors which drive the results. It seems likely
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that more than one factor play a role. Merger and acquisition activity,
the presence of scale economies, and the role of regulation each appear to
have had a role. As suggested by Kim et al. (2003), movements in market
shares can also be used to infer (and measure) switching costs. By making
it costly for consumers to change bank - and consequently more difficult
for a new bank to acquire new clients, switching costs tend to limit entry
as well as shuﬄe in market shares. To this end, other investigations are
required. However, from this simple analysis is possible to infer that the
Italian Banking industry experienced movement towards higher levels of
competition. In particular, these results match those on the local level
competition of Guiso et al. (2004). By looking at the long-term effect
of the regulatory restriction, they found that, after the deregulation pro-
cess, there was a catching up of the areas (especially the provinces in the
South) where the banking market was less competitive during the regula-
tion period. So, the presence of unit root in the market share data of this
macro-region is consistent with their analysis.
2.6 Conclusions
The paper proposed the use of unit root tests in the setting of micro panel
data sets to assess market share instability in order to get an understanding
of the competitive condition in an industry. Using Italian Banking micro-
panel, this study empirically tests the presence of unit roots in the series of
market shares of the first five banks in each province. The presence of unit
roots in the market share data could be interpreted, in fact, as signal of
an industry that experienced the displacement of the leading bank by its
competitors. On the other hand, if share turn out to be mean reverting, it
is reasonable to conclude that the industry is rather stable and competitors
reached positions difficult to overcome.
Two simple t-tests based on least squares estimators, which are consis-
tent only under the unit root null, have been proposed. Those tests are
shown to have good size properties and at least as high power as tests based
on GMM and ML estimators. According to those tests, the hypothesis of
unit root tests cannot always be rejected for all the subgroups considered
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in the analysis.
However, these tests do not consider the possibility of cross-section
correlation amongst units. To check if the panel at hand is characterized by
cross-section dependence, the Pesaran’s cross-section dependence test was
applied. The Pesaran’s statistics clearly indicated the presence of cross-
section dependence. As a consequence, the ADF regression proposed by
Pesaran was applied. In that case, results strongly confirmed the presence
of unit root tests.
The kind of exercises performed in this article could only offer (pre-
liminary) indications of the dynamic of market shares in an industry. To
individuate which factors drive the results, of course, other analyses are
required. Nevertheless, as this simple application to the Italian banking
case shows, panel unit root tests are useful and versatile tools that, com-
bined with an institutional knowledge of the industry under investigation,
could offer interesting insights on the industry competitive process.
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Chapter 3
Relationship Lending and
Firm Innovativeness: New
Empirical Evidence
Abstract
The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of relationship lending on
firm innovativeness, disentangling the impact of bank ties on the discovery
phase from that in the introduction phase of new technologies. Results
suggest that for small and low-tech firms, banks do not carry out a sophis-
ticated intervention at the stage of development of new technologies and,
rather, they play their traditional role in financing investments of other-
wise financially constrained firms. On the contrary, relationship banks do
play an important role even in the discovery phase for high-tech firms.
Keywords: Credit relationship, external financing, bank competition.
JEL Classification: C34, G21, O31.
3.1 Introduction
As the fourth Community Innovation Survey highlighted, for the majority
of Italian firms the main obstacle inhibiting innovation is still represented
by financial factors. Firm’s financial need, however, is not constant and
varies in relation to firm characteristics as well as project phases. For
example, during the so-called seed phase, the financial need to carry out a
feasibility study is rather low, whereas it is high in the start-up phase, when
the project has to be implemented. During the early growth stage, instead,
a firm requires considerable fundings in order to market its innovative
products. Lacking the visibility of more established firms, young and small
firms are likely to suffer even more for the financing of their investments
because of asymmetric information problems (Berger and Udell (1998)).
Moreover, the different phases of a project are characterized by different
degree of risk.
Relying on a panel of Italian manufacturing firms, the main objec-
tive of the following empirical investigation is to examine the effects of
relationship lending on firm innovativeness identifying two phases of the
innovation process: the ‘discovery phase’, which roughly corresponds to
the seed and start-up phases, and the ‘introduction phase’, which in the
spirit of this paper is similar to the early growth phase.
As Italy has strongly relied on relationship banking to finance invest-
ments, focusing on Italian firms allows to isolate the role of bank-firm
relationship in fostering innovation. In particular, Italian banks seem bet-
ter suited to financing innovation embodied in physical capital rather than
R&D investment. As it is documented in Ughetto (2007), there is a strik-
ing difference in the share of bank loans as a source of funds for fixed
capital compared with that one for R&D projects. In the same line, Her-
rera and Minetti (2007) suggest that relationship banks do not carry out a
sophisticated intervention at the stage of assessment and development of
new technologies and they, rather, play their traditional role in financing
investments of otherwise financially constrained firms.
In order to disentangle the effects of bank ties on the discovery phase
from those in the phase of introduction and adoption of new technolo-
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gies, the following analysis proceed in two steps, first by measuring firm
propensity to innovate, and, then, by estimating firm intensity to innovate
in the introduction phase, as measured by the percentage of new products
in total sales. From the econometric perspective, it means to adopt a gen-
eralised tobit model which tries to account for the fact that firms are either
innovative or not, and, for those that are innovative, the extent to which
they are so (Mohnen et al. (2006)). This strategy has several advantages.
Firstly, it allows to distinguish between different levers that bank can use
to influence innovation, among which the provision of funds is of course
the most important. Distinguishing between invention and introduction of
new technologies is also important in the light of firm innovation patterns,
as Italian firms tend to absorb innovations from outside than in carrying
out research. Finally, it allows to control for selectivity problems.
As the empirical determinants of relationship lending have been already
investigated in the literature (i.e., Elsas (2005)), I will only give a recall of
its key elements so as to focus on the reasons why bank ties should affect
firm innovative capacity.
To get a complete picture, since the dataset also offers indications on
the other type of financing, I will take into account other sources of finance
available to the firms, as well as the role of public incentives. Since banks
are by far the most important source of external finance in Italy, it is
reasonable to expect the internal sources to play a crucial role in financing
innovation.
Another important peculiarity of the Italian banking system is its de-
limitation in local areas, corresponding to 103 provinces which are geo-
graphical units close to US counties (Colombo and Turati (2004); Guiso
et al. (2004, 2006)). The geographical segmentation is relevant in order
to identify the level at which competition indicators, which are important
control variables in the present analysis, have to be computed.
Closely related to this analysis are the works of Benfratello et al. (2007)
and Herrera and Minetti (2007). However, it differentiates from them for
various reasons. First of all, the more recent dataset used. This work will
in fact rely also on the last Capitalia survey (the ninth). It also departs
from Benfratello et al. (2007) for having a deeper look at the effects on
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innovation of specific bank-firm ties (such as the duration), distinguish-
ing the discovery from the introduction phase, instead of focusing on the
level of financial development. With respect to the work of Herrera and
Minetti (2007), the methodology adopted is substantially different. These
authors in fact investigated the possibility of endogeneity of the relation-
ship variables while estimating the probability of introducing innovation.
In this work, the method of estimation should account for this problem,
considering in addition other important variables that in their work have
been neglected. In particular, the effects of intensity of fixed capital and
R&D Investment, as well as the role of internal source of financing in the
probability of being innovative.
The paper is structured in the following way. Next section gives an
overview of the literature while section 3, after a brief recall of the empirical
determinants of relationship lending, explores its possible links with firm
innovativeness. Section 4 presents the dataset and the main descriptive
statistics on the degree of firm innovativeness. Section 5 presents the model
and the results by distinguishing the introduction and discovery phases of
innovation. On the contrary, section 6 presents a deeper analysis for the
discovery phase only. The final section summarizes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
A lively macro-economic debate on the role of financial architecture in
fostering innovation and technology is the one on the bank-based versus
market-based system (i.e.,Carlin and Mayer (2003), Levine (2002)). Are
bank-based systems at the advantage in processing information particu-
larly relevant for firms’ incentive to innovate? The available evidence is
rather mixed but findings suggest that market-based system do not domi-
nate bank-based system and vice-versa in all times. However, knowledge-
intensive industries, with soft, hard-to-monitor complex activities seem to
get on better in bank based financial systems (Tadesse (2007)).
Even though researchers have argued theoretically, and tested empir-
ically, that there is a link between finance and innovation, there is still
little in the extant micro-economic literature about the functions of the
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various sources of funding in the different phases of innovation (O’ Sullivan
(2004)). The main contribution of this paper is to make another step in
this direction, enhancing our understanding of the role played by banks
ties in the phases of invention and introduction of new technologies.
In fact, this paper relates to two, somehow separated, strands of em-
pirical literature. The first comprehends articles on the economics of in-
novation. During the past decade, a number of countries in Europe have
implemented enterprise-based surveys of innovative activity (i.e., Commu-
nity Innovation Survey (CIS). At the same time, important progress has
been made in modelling appropriate econometric methods for innovation
survey data. Hall and Mairasse (2006) provide an interesting review of the
empirical studies on innovation.
The second strand mainly relates to works investigating bank-firm re-
lationship. Since there is a vast literature, I only refer to works related to
the Italian banking system. For a review of the literature see Elyasiani and
Goldberg (2004) and Degryse and Ongena (2008). Some of these works
investigate the credit access for firms belonging to industrial districts. Re-
lying on the ninth Capitalia survey Ughetto (2006) and Rotondi(2005)
show that firms in industrial districts are less likely to be credit rationed.
In particular, Alessandrini et al. (2008) evidence that the incidence of rela-
tionship lending for firms in industrial districts is not significantly different
from the average. Ferri and Messori (2000) show that arm’s length pat-
terns prevail in the Northwest, the area of oldest industrialization with
larger banks and firms, whereas relationship banking patterns prevail in
the rest of the country, populated to a larger extent by smaller banks and
firms.
Someways in-between, there are the works of Benfratello et al. (2007)
and Herrera and Minetti (2007) which, instead, stress - at micro level - the
role of Italian banks in fostering innovation. Benfratello et al. (2007) find
strong evidence that banking development has a significant and important
impact effect on process innovation and a weaker effect on product inno-
vation. In addition, they find that banking development has lessened the
severity of financing constraints faced by small firms. Herrera and Minetti
(2007) test the impact on innovation of the information of the main bank
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- proxied by the duration of credit relationship. They observe that firms
with longer credit relationship have higher probability to innovate. Fur-
thermore, the length of the relationship seem to foster the acquisition of
new technologies rather than internal research. Using a large panel of US
companies, Atanassov et al. (2007) explore the relationship between arm’s
length financing and innovation taking patents as a measure of innovative
output. They found that firms that relied more on arm’s length financing
are associated with a larger number of patents. They also conclude that
this correlation is mainly driven by innovative firms choosing their capital
structure. Relying on firm-level data from a survey conducted in Finland,
but looking instead at the role of public policy, the work of Hyytinen and
Toivanen (2005) provides evidence that capital-market imperfections de-
lay innovation, and government funding disproportionately helps firms in
industries that are more dependent on external finance. They used as a
measure of firm innovativeness the level of R&D expenditure.
3.3 Relationship lending and Firm innova-
tiveness
In this section, in order to identify the main variables to be used in the
empirical analysis, first, I will recall the key elements of relationship lend-
ing. Then, I will investigate the reasons why relationship lending should
affect the phases of innovation. For a detailed description of the empirical
determinants of relationship lending see Elsas (2005), whereas for an ana-
lytical survey on the effects of relationship lending on the pricing of loans,
as well as its effect on the degree of competition, see Freixas (2005).
3.3.1 Empirical determinants of relationship lending
Relationship lending represents the informational privilege that a bank ac-
cumulates over time by establishing close ties with its borrower (Ongena
and Smith (2001)). Reflecting the idea that long tenure depicts the rela-
tionship intensity, the most commonly proxy for relationship lending is the
duration of a bank-borrower relationship. The exclusivity of bank relation-
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ship is also regarded as an indicator of close ties between the bank and the
borrower. In this regards, the number of bank relationships should capture
the possibility for bank to realize the economic benefit associated with the
relationship. A negative correlation between the number of banks and the
development of relationship lending is reasonable. Finally, a higher debt
financing share should increase the likelihood of relationship lending.
3.3.2 Relationship lending and innovation
In Italy relationship lending has always been a way to channel funds to
productive investments. In fact, despite its development, the stock market
does not play a crucial role, while specialized financiers play a marginal
role. In 2004, in the comparison between the Italian and the European
venture capital industry - in term of venture capital and private equity
instruments over GDP - Italy ranked 12th, with all other large European
economies ranking well above. In addition, the Italian venture capital in-
dustry is focused on later-stage investments: on average, in 2004, early
stage financing represented only 2% of total investments in Italy com-
pared with 6.4% in Europe (Gregoriou et al. (2006)). Banks, in particular,
turned out to be better suited to finance innovation embodied in physi-
cal capital rather than technological progress (Ughetto (2007)). As Ital-
ian firms typically do not receive external equity, internal equity finance
(auto-financing/cashflow) represented an important source of innovation
financing as well. Capitalia survey shows that, in 2001-2003, for 83% of
firms auto-financing still represents the main source to finance innovation,
followed by 10% of firms relying more on public incentives, and 5% on
banks loans.
Different theoretical arguments point out that investment in R&D ac-
tivities is different from investment in capital goods. First, R&D project
may not be easily understood by outsiders and create large intangible
assets which cannot be used as a collateral (Hall (2002)). In addition,
expected returns of R&D are uncertain and difficult to estimate. Finally,
as suggested by Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), firms may be reluctant
to finance externally their R&D project for strategic reasons.
In which way then, relationship lending affects firm innovative capac-
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ity? Can it mitigate firm resort to internal finance? What makes a rela-
tionship lender special?
In addition to have a direct effect on the quantity of R&D and invest-
ment spending, banks may also affect the nature of the selected project,
the quality of internal inputs as well as their effectiveness in generating in-
novation. In particular, their ability to offer multi-period contracts, which
are much more effective than one-shot contracts (i.e. transactions) in ex-
tracting information, may be helpful in the allocation process and the
mechanisms that allow firms to make commitments of resources to innova-
tive activities, notwithstanding the challenges of doing so. As Boot (2000)
argued, relationship banking goes beyond lending and includes other ser-
vices as well. In this regard, relationship lending leaves room for flexibility
and discretion allowing the utilization of non-contractable information and
addressing contractual features that are possibly unique. Furthermore, the
firm can disclose information to the bank without worrying about it spilling
over competitors.
On the other hand, close and durable relationship may involve ineffi-
ciencies related to the hold-up and soft-budget-constraint problems. The
hold-up problem refers to the possibility that relationship bank may ex-
tract rents thus causing inefficient choice investment (see von Thadden
(1995), and for a review Allen and Carletti (2008)), whereas the soft-
budget-constraint problem concerns the bank’s incentive to refinance some
of the ex-post inefficient projects (Dewatripont and Roland (2000)).
3.4 Data description
The data used in this work are obtained by the two most recent waves - the
8th and the 9th - of the comprehensive survey on Italian manufacturing
firms carried out by Capitalia (and previously by Mediocredito Centrale)
every three years1. These surveys are conducted through questionnaires,
administered to a representative sample of manufacturing firms within the
national borders. Questionnaires collected information over the previous
1See “Indagine sulle imprese manifatturiere” http://www.capitalia.it/pages/
studi02b.htm.
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three years (1998-2000 and 2001-2003) and, for the majority of the firms,
are supplemented with standard balance sheet data. The 8th and the 9th
survey include respectively 4289 and 4497 firms. To broaden the sample
period of the analysis, I merged these two waves and obtained a reduced
sample of 2097 firms. This sample includes only those firms exiting in both
surveys and therefore with potentially complete observations over the 1998-
2003 period. I further excluded firms with incomplete information or with
extreme values. I will progressively use the panel structure of the data in
order to check and address the endogeneity problems.
Based on this sample, tables (1) and (2) report the population per-
centages (and standard errors) of firms with either product or process
innovation. The most important information is the increasing percentage
of innovative firms, across size and sectors, over the period considered (the
only exception is the % of firms with more than 500 employes doing pro-
cess innovation). These higher percentages reflect the higher number of
firms doing R&D. As table (3) shows, particularly in high-tech industries,
the majority of firms are envolved in R&D activities. This is even more
visible for larger firms where this percentage reached 92% in high-tech sec-
tors2. Table (4) reports the (population) mean of the variables measuring
relationship lending for the period 2001-2003. There are not significant
differences in the duration of the relationship with the main bank, in the
bank main share, and in the number of lending banks between small low-
tech and high-tech firms, as well as for large low-tech and high-tech firms.
There are significant differences when comparing these values according to
the size variable. Interesting to note, however, is that there are no signif-
icant differences for small and large high-tech firms in the mean value of
the variables related to the main bank (duration and share).
2Firms where classified as in:
- low-tech sectors: textile, wood, food, plastic, paper, coke, non metallic and nec
(not elsewhere classified).
- high-tech sectors: vehicles, machinery and chemicals
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3.5 The empirical model and results
I adopt a generalized (Type 2) Tobit model consisting of two equations,
where the first one is a probit equation determining whether a firm in-
novates or not (“propensity to innovate”), and the second one is a linear
regression (the Tobit equation or “intensity to innovate”) explaining how
much the firm innovates (Mohnen et al. (2006)). I will measure firm inno-
vative propensity by means of new processes and new products introduced
into the market, whereas the firm innovation intensity can be measured
by the share of innovative sales in total sales. Contrary to other type of
surveys (i.e, Community Innovation Survey - CIS), it is not possible to
distinguish between innovative sales corresponding to products new to the
firm but possibly known to the market, which can be considered imitations
of products already produced by other competitors, and those correspond-
ing to products only new to the market, which can be regarded as true
innovations.
Denoting by y1i the binary variable indicating if firm i is an innovating
firm - that is, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm either has
introduced at least one product or process innovation - I can write
y1i =
{
= 1 if y∗1i > 0
= 0 if y∗1i ≤ 0 (3.1)
where y∗1i = x1ib1+u1i is a latent variable that represents the incentives
to innovate. x1i is a vector of explanatory variables, b1 is a vector of pa-
rameters to be estimated, and u1i is a random error term, which includes
the effect of left-out omitted variables. As explanatory variables x1i, in
addition to the amount of resources spent on R&D per employee ([IE])
and fixed capital per employee([INV EST ]), I use an industry dummy
([HIGH_TECH]), a size variable ([LOGSIZE]), and a dummy for listed
company ([LISTED]). The industry dummy (HIGH_TECH]) captures
technological opportunity conditions, industry-targeted innovation poli-
cies, and high-tech specific differential demand growth effect. Size - mea-
sured by the log of the number of employees - reflects access to finance,
scale economies and difference in the organization of work (Mohnen et al.
(2006)). In order to account for the fact that young firms grow faster
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(Klomp 1996), I add a dummy for firms that are less than three years old
([Y OUNG]). It could be valuable to include a dummy also for firms that
underwent structural change ([M&As]) during the period of the analysis
and for firms operating in international markets ([INTERN. COMP ]).
As the main objective of my investigation is to control how relationship
lending affect firm innovativeness, I estimate the probability to be innova-
tive controlling for relationship lending including in the explanatory set,
x1i, variables representing
• the share of the main bank: [BANK_SHARE]
• the duration of the relationship: [LENGTH]
• the number of bank lenders: [NUM_BANKS]
Finally, to account for the possibility to have access to other sources of
funding, I include in the regressors a dummy variable, [FIN_INSTR], for
firms that relied on innovative financial instruments, such as financial bills,
project finance, or private bond. The second equation of the Tobit (type 2)
model is specified in terms of a second latent variable y∗2i which is equal to
the actual share of innovative sales y2i, if the firm is innovative (i.e, y∗1i >
0). Since the share of innovative sales is bounded by 0 and 1, it is preferable
to perform a logit transformation of the data and express this second
equation in terms of the latent logit-share variable z∗2i = ln(y∗2i/(1− y∗2i))
which vary from −∞ to +∞. Thus I can write our second equation as
z2i =
{
= z∗2i if y
∗
1i > 0
= undefined if y∗1i ≤ 0 (3.2)
or equivalently
y2i =
{
= ez
∗
2i/(1 + ez
∗
2i) if y∗1i > 0
= 0 if y∗1i ≤ 0
(3.3)
where z∗2i = x2ib2 + u2i.
x2 is a vector of explanatory variables, b2 is a vector of parameters to
be estimated and u2i > 0 is an error term reflecting omitted variables.
Since I have data on sale growth for the majority of the firms in the panel,
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I decide to exploit the panel structure of the data in order to exclude the
variable past sales growth ([g_sales[t−1]]) from the explanatory variables
I have in x2i, and to include it in x1i. This variable in fact can be a de-
termining factor of innovation, as reflecting stronger demand and easier
internal and external access to finance. There are a lot of missing values
in the variables of interest. For example, many firms do not indicate the
amount of resources spent on R&D. The final sample is made of 1258 ob-
servations for the period 2001-2003. I also present some results using as
exclusionary variable [rationed[t−1]], a dummy variable which is equal to
1 if the firm answered to be credit rationed in the previous survey. Results
are substantially equal, even though this variable resulted more signifi-
cant in some specifications. However, g_sales[t−1] seems more reliable
since it based on balance sheet data - instead of being determined by firm
assessment - and it offers indications on the role of internal sources 3.
Assuming that u1 and u2 are bivariate normal with zero mean, and
σu1 = 1, I can estimate the model as a generalized Tobit (type 2) model us-
ing STATA Heckman procedure for survey analysis. Preliminary results for
the model without considering any financial variables are reported in table
(5). Table (6) reports results for the basic model relying on rationed[t−1]
instead of g_sales[t−1] as exclusionary variable. Those preliminary results
suggest the plausibility of the model, and the significance of the ρ coef-
ficient indicates selection problems in the intensity innovation equation.
Results for traditional regressors are in line with the literature. Firms
with higher spending on R&D and fixed investments are those most likely
to introduce an innovation. Larger and listed firms, especially in high-tech
industries, are also more likely to be innovative and to have a higher per-
centage of sales stemming from innovative products. International agree-
ments on production as well as public incentives also positively affect firm
capacity to innovate.
In table (7) results for the model controlling for financial variables are
3More precisely, firms are defined to be credit rationed if answer yes to all the
following question: 1. whether at the current market interest rate they wish a larger
amount of credit; 2. whether they would be willing to accept a small increase in the
interest rate charged in order to obtain more credit 3. whether they have applied for
credit but have been turned down by the financial intermediary.
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reported. These results evidence that relationship variables do matter in
explaining firm innovative capacity: the variables accounting for the share
of the main bank and the number of lending banks are jointly highly signif-
icant, both in the intensity and propensity to innovate equation. However,
theoretical and empirical works suggest that the market for SME finance
is imperfect (see, for example, Alessandrini et al. (2007); Carpenter and
Petersen (2002); Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005)): the opportunity cost
of investments (the marginal cost of capital schedule) is higher for small
firms (upward-sloping curve). That means, SMEs that are in need of (ex-
ternal) capital are more likely to pursue some innovations and positively
affected by long-term relationship with some banks. To account for this
possibility, and to control how it will affect the role of bank relationship
in fostering innovation, table (7) also reports results for relationship vari-
ables interacted with a dummy variable for SMALL firms. A higher share
of the major lending bank will have a positive effect on the capacity of
small firms to translate innovation into a greater percentage of firm sales
stemming from innovative products. This result is in line with those of
Herrera and Minetti (2007) which found that relationship banks do not
carry out a sophisticated intervention at the stage of assessment and de-
velopment of new technologies. On the other hand, contrary to what have
been found by Herrera and Minetti (2007), longer relationship may have
counter positive effect on firm capacity to innovate. However, this result is
not highly significant. The overall effect on both the capacity and intensity
to innovate is significant at 10% level. Moreover, these results are robust
and reinforced if [SMALL] is replaced by [LOGSIZE] as in the baseline
regression, and if the exclusionary variable [g_sales[t− 1]] is replaced by
a dummy variable for firms being credit rationed in the previous survey
(see table (8)).
3.5.1 Relationship Lending and Measure of Depen-
dence on External Finance
Relying on the same set of variables used in the previous section, and by
further exploiting the panel structure of the data, in this section I will es-
timate the previous model by identifying industries’ technological demand
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for external finance. The reason for bringing into the picture this variable
is related to the necessity to control for some specific industry features
which may affect both the firm capacity to innovate and the role of bank
ties. In order to do that, following Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) and
differently from Benfratello et al. (2007), I will compute my own measure
for external dependence for Italian manufacturing firms, amending the Ra-
jan and Zingales (1998)’s methodology (RZ). The main assumption of RZ
is that there are technological reasons why some industries rely more on
external finance than others (i.e, gestation periods of products, the initial
project scale, the cash harvest period). It seems important therefore to
look how these ’intrinsic’ industry features may affect bank ties, and ulti-
mately firm capacity to innovate. It is reasonable to think that the effects
of relationship lending variables should vary with the needs of external
capital: the more firms are dependent on external finance, the stronger
the ties with banks, and the higher the effects on firm innovativeness.
However, it would be risky to assume that industry demands for external
financing in Italy will be the same of large listed US firms. Shifting the
focus to between industry differences, therefore, I will build a measure of
external finance dependence using firm-level variables as collected during
the eight Capitalia survey. As in Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005), I estimate
the measure of external finance, using a financial planning model (called
also the percentage of sales approach, see Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(2002)). This index, denoted by EFN , measures the proportion of firms
whose annual growth rate of sales exceeds the maximum growth rate that
can be financed if a firm relies only on its internal resources and maintain
its dividend (see box 1).
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Box 1: External Financial
Need The percentage of sales model
relates a firm growth rate to its need
for external funds. The external fi-
nancing need, EFNt, at time t grow-
ing at gt percent a year is given by
EFNt = gtAssetst −
(1 + gt)Earningst ∗ bt
On the right hand side, the first term
is the required investment for growing
at gt percent while the second term is
the internally available capital for in-
vestment, taking bt - the proportion
of the firm earnings that are retained
for reinvestment at time t - as given.
Earnings are calculated after interest
and taxes. I compute two estimates
of each firm’s attainable growth rate.
The maximum growth rate that can
be financed if a firm relies only on its
internal resources and maintains its
dividend, IG, is obtained by assum-
ing that the firm retains all its earn-
ings (that is bt = 1), equating EFNt
to zero and solving for gt
IGt = ROAt/(1−ROAt)
where ROA is the firm’s return on as-
sets. Thus, more profitable firms can
find more resources internally. Then,
I compare for each firm in the sample
its actual growth rate with the rate,
IG, defined above.
Finally, I compute for each indus-
try (according to NACE classifica-
tion) the proportion of firms in finan-
cial needs, that is those firms whose
mean actual growth rate is above the
mean maximum attainable. To check
the robustness of the measure, I also
compute the same percentage, assum-
ing that firms does not pay dividends
and obtain just enough debt financ-
ing to maintain a constant ratio of
total debt to assets (implicitly also a
summing that the firm does not issue
equity or increase leverage). Again,
setting EFNt to zero, and using the
value of equity in place of total as-
sets, the growth rate is now equal to
SG = ROE/(1− ROE). These mea-
sure are conservative in three ways.
First, each maximum growth assumes
that a firm utilizes the unconstrained
sources of finance no more intensively
that it is currently doing. Second,
firms with spare capacity do not need
to invest and may grow at a faster
rate than predicted by the model.
Third, the financial planning model
abstract from technical advancement
that reduce the requirements for in-
vestment capital. Thus it may over-
state the cost of growth and underes-
timate the maximum growth rate at-
tainable using unconstrained sources
of finance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Mak-
simovic (1998, 2002)).
Those firms whose actual mean growth rates are above the maximum
one are assumed to be in need of external finance. The main advantage of
computing this index is to (partially) control also for reverse causality. As
pointed out by Herrera and Minetti (2007), measures such as the length
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of the relationship might be endogenous to the innovation process. The
econometric specification chosen, already accounts for selectivity problem,
as the significance level of ρ coefficient in the various specification indeed
points out. Since the measure of external financial dependence is computed
at industry level (NACE classifications), and using data on the eight sur-
vey, it is not affected by the current firm behaviour. The introduction of
such a measure in interaction with relationship lending variables should
therefore account for the possibility that firm with greater financial need
will tend to have longer/strength ties with lending banks. Results are re-
ported in table (9) using the ROE version of the EFN index (see Box 1).
In the first two column, the variable EFN is simply added to the basic
model. In the last two column of table (9), EFN is introduced also in
interaction with relationship lending variables. From that analysis three
points deserve a remark. First of all, and contrary to the previous analysis
for small banks, the variables accounting for relationship lending turned
out to be jointly significant at 1% level in the ’discovery phase’, suggest-
ing that banks play an important role in the process of discovering new
products and processes in those sector that grow faster, that is, which are
more in need of external finance. Secondly, these regressions play down the
importance of the share of the main banks (although still positive for firm
with higher EFN), being significant only at 10% level in both equations.
Finally, the length of the relationship and the number of lending banks
are now significant - respectively at 10% and 5% level - in the propensity
to innovate equation. In particular, they have a negative effect on the
probability of introducing an innovation in those sectors that are more in
financial need. Results using the ROA version of the EFN (not reported)
instead only confirms the (weak) explanatory power of the bank share vari-
able. Even in this case, results are not affected if the exclusionary variable
[g_sales[t − 1]] is replaced by a dummy variable for firms being credit
rationed in the previous survey.
To sum up, the analysis performed controlling also for financial need
confirms the importance of the role of the main bank in fostering innovation
and suggest some possible counter positive effects when this relationship
becomes longer.
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3.5.2 Bank competition and Innovation
The level of competition among banks represents a factor which may ei-
ther strengthen or weaken firm ties with the bank. On the one hand,
there are theories that argue that competition and relationships are in-
compatible since banks may not enjoy the possibilities to extract profit
later on in the relationship (Petersen and Rajan (1995)). On the other
hand, other theories argue that more competition may instead increase
relationship lending, allowing banks to mitigate the effects of fiercer com-
petition extracting higher rents (Boot (2000); Boot and Thakor (2000)).
Empirical works indeed suggest that competition and relationship lending
are not necessary inimical (Degryse and Ongena (2007), Elsas (2005)). In
order to bring this element into the analysis, I will compute an index of
banking competition at provincial level. The Italian territory is divided
into 20 regions and 103 provinces, which are geographical units close to
US counties. In accordance with the Italian Antitrust Authority, the pre-
sumption is that the province is the relevant market. More specifically,
I will include in the regressors the number of bank branches per squared
kilimoter [BANK_COMP ] in each province. The branch density repre-
sents the monopolistic power of each branch and could be considered as a
proxy of the (inverse of) transportation costs. More branches in the same
provinces means, for each consumer, a lower distance to cover to reach
a branch, a weaker power exerted by bank branch and an overall higher
degree of competition (Degryse and Ongena (2005)). BANK_COMP is
a measure similar to the one propose by Benfratello et al. (2007), the num-
ber of branches per habitants4. In addition to that index, I also consider
a traditional measure of market concentration, represented by sum of the
market share of the first three banks [CH3]. Even in this case, I will focus
on local markets by measuring market shares at the provincial level using
data on branches as proxies for the market share of individual (or group
of) banks. However, one must be cautious in interpreting this measure as
a proxy of banking competition. As Claessens and Laeven (2004)’ analy-
4This measure can be considered as a proxy for the (inverse of) queuing costs. The
less the population served by each branch (or the higher the number of branches for
each individual), the lower the cost met by the customers.
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sis shows, variables describing the banking system structure may not be
good summary statistics for bank competitive environment. Conversely,
these authors found that more concentrated banking system face a greater
degree of competition. In this case, BANK_COMP and CH3 are nega-
tively correlated (-0.41599). Table (10) presents results adding the banking
competition controls. Interestingly, for both those measures, there is a neg-
ative correlation with the firm innovativeness, in the introduction as well
as in the discovery phase. However, BANK_COMP is not significant.
The concentration index CH3 is instead significant at 10% level. This re-
sult suggests that less concentrated credit markets might foster innovation
(Spagnolo (2004)). It is interesting to see how that variable interact with
the external financial need. Results are reported in the last two column of
table (10). The relationship is negative and significant in the introduction
phase, whereas it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the overall ef-
fect in the discovery phase is zero. Instead, no significant interactions have
been found between relationship and competition variables (not reported).
3.6 Relationship lending in the discovery
phase
Relying on the same set of (time-varying) variables used in the previous
section, and by completely exploiting the panel structure of the data, in
this final section I will focus on the effects of bank ties in the discovery
phase only, in order to better control for endogeneity issues. Given that
I only have two observations about the introduction of innovation (in the
eight and ninth survey), it is not possible to fully address the endogeneity
problems and to identify casual links. However, since one fundamental
problem is to control for unobserved firm characteristics that are constant
over time, the conditional logit model will work properly. Conditional
logit models eliminate the firm specific effects, but only switchers (that
is, firms that introduced an innovation in just one of the two sub-periods)
contribute to the likelihood function. Therefore, I can rely on a restricted
number of observations, as only around 40% of the sample is made up of
swicthers and not all the explanatory variables are observed for all firms
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in both periods. I cannot indeed control for another potential source of
endogeneity caused by technological shock that leads, for example, to an
increase both in the probability of observing an innovation and in the
research intensity (Parisi et al. (2006)). As in the previous analysis, re-
lationship lending variables turned out to be significant in explaining the
probability of introducing process or product innovations. In the model
presented in table (11), they are jointly significant at 10% level. The most
important result is again the role played by the share of the main bank.
However, and coherently with the previous analysis, it is not possible to
reject the hypthosis that the overall effect of small firms is equal to zero.
Again, banks seems not play a crucial role in the discovery phase for small
firms. In the second column of table (11), I reestimate the model using
a dummy variable for R&D, in [IE]’s stead, the variable measuring the
amount of resource spent in R&D per employee, since there are firms that
have reported to do R&D but were not able to indicate how much they
spent for this purpose. In the same way, [INV E] - replacing [INV EST ] -
is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm declared that has invested in fixed
capital but was not able to indicate the amount. Results are substantially
identical.
In addition, in table (12), I repeat the same analysis but distinguishing
the effects for high-tech and low-tech firms. At 10% level, it is possible to
reject the hypothesis that the variables representing bank ties are jointly
equal to zero for high-tech firms, whereas the same it is not true for low-
tech firms. Looking at high-tech firms, then, it seems that bank might
play a crucial role also in the introduction phase. In particular, for high-
tech firms, the length of the relationship turned out to be individually
significant at 10% level. Those results are confirmed and reinforced in
column (2).
These regressions confirm the importance of bank ties in affecting firm
innovative capacity, even though this is particularly true for firms in high
tech sectors. The variables representing bank relationship behave in both
regressions alike. Then, in line with the results of Herrera and Minetti
(2007), it is possible to conclude that for small and low-tech firms, banks
do not carry out a sophisticated intervention at the stage of assessment and
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development of new technologies and they, rather, play their traditional
role in financing investments of otherwise financially constrained firms.
For high-tech firms, instead, banks do play an important role even in the
discovery phase.
3.7 Conclusions
Using data on sample of Italian manufacturing firms, this study investi-
gated the effects of relationship lending on firm innovativeness, disentan-
gling the impact of bank ties on the discovery phase from that in the intro-
duction phase and adoption of new technologies. As Schumpeter argued in
his earliest writing on the microeconomics of innovation, banks are pivotal
players in the innovation process and play a central role in real-sector in-
novation, not merely as a conduits for the movement of capital funds from
saver to entrepreneur. In Italy, in particular, relationship lending has al-
ways been a way to channel funds to productive investments, since both
the stock market and specialized financiers have played a marginal role.
However, despite the current richness of enterprise-based survey on inno-
vative activity, there is still little in the extant micro-economic literature
about the different role of the various sources of funding in the introduc-
tion and invention of new technologies. On the contrary, at a macro-level,
there is a lively debate on the role of financial architecture (bank-based
versus market-based) in fostering innovation and technology.
Results from the present micro-econometric analysis suggest that for
small firms and low-tech firms, banks do not carry out a sophisticated in-
tervention at the development stage of the innovation. Similarly to other
analysis, Italian banks appear to play their traditional role in financing
investments of otherwise financially constrained firms. In particular, a
higher share of the main lending bank has a positive impact on the capac-
ity of small firms to translate the innovation into a greater percentage of
firms sales stemming from innovative products. On the contrary, relation-
ship banks turned out to play an important role even in discovery phase
for firms in high-tech sectors. These results are robust after controlling for
a measure of external financial dependence across sectors and the level of
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banking competition. In particular, even if some regressions downplayed
its role, the share of the main bank proved to be a key variable. The length
of the relationship and the number of lending banks exhibit instead nega-
tive and significant effects on the probability of introducing an innovation,
especially in those sectors that are more in financial need.
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.1 APPENDIX I
In this section the variables used in the regressions are described. They
are obtained from the 8th and 9th survey on Italian manufacturing firms
carried out by Capitalia every three years.
INNOVATION: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the enterprise
reports having introduced new production processes or products during
2001
Pct_SALES: Share of turnover in 2003 due to new products or process
introduced during 2001-2003.
IE:Average total expenditure for internal and external R&D divided per
employees over the period 2001-2003.
R&D: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm reports to have
done R&D during the period 2001-2003.
INVEST: Average gross investments in innovative tangible goods per em-
ployees over the period 2001-2003.
INVE: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm reports to have
invested in innovative tangible during the period 2001-2003.
YOUNG: dummy equal to 1 if the firms is less then three years old
SMALL: dummy equal to 1 if the firms has less than 50 employees.
M&As: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm’s was involved
in merger and acquisition dealings.
INTERN._COMP: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the en-
terprise’s most significant market is international (outside EU).
INTERN._AGR.: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the en-
terprise has developed technical agreement with firms operating in inter-
national markets (outside EU).
PATENTS_BOUGHT: dummy which takes the value 1 if the firms
bought patents during the period 2001-2003.
PATENTS_SOLD: dummy which takes the value 1 if the firms sold
patents during the period 2001-2003.
PUBLIC_INCEN.: dummy which takes the value 1 if the firms relied
on public incentives during the period 2001-2003.
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LISTED: dummy which takes the value 1 if the firm is listed in the stock
market
LOGSIZE: the log of the average number of employees during the period.
2001-2003
BANK_SHARE: the share of the main bank
LENGTH:the duration of the relationship with the main bank
NUM_BANKS: the number of bank lenders
FIN._INSTR.: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the firm relied on
innovative financial instruments during the period 2001-2003
BANK_COMP: number of branches per squared kilometer
CH3: market share of the first three banks
EFN: index of external financial dependence computed using firm-level
variables as collected during the period 1998-2000
g_sales[t-1]: the turnover growth rate computed using variables as col-
lected during the period 1998-2000
rationed[t-1]: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm turned
out be credit rationed during the period 1998-2000
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Table 1: % of firms with a product innovation
FIRMS SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.160 (0.014) 0.253 (0.027) 0.268 (0.017) 0.454 (0.034)
21-50 0.220 (0.015) 0.323 (0.032) 0.355 (0.016) 0.501 (0.027)
51-250 0.281 (0.030) 0.346 (0.039) 0.415 (0.015) 0.569 (0.022)
251-500 0.355 (0.064) 0.613 (0.076) 0.421 (0.046) 0.702 (0.050)
>500 0.598 (0.102) 0.671 (0.090) 0.391 (0.042) 0.426 (0.045)
() standard errors
Table 2: % of firms with a process innovation
FIRM SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.287 (0.017) 0.321 (0.029) 0.287 (0.017) 0.297 (0.031)
21-50 0.364 (0.018) 0.397 (0.033) 0.371 (0.016) 0.417 (0.026)
51-250 0.490 (0.034) 0.497 (0.041) 0.494 (0.015) 0.508 (0.023)
251-500 0.460 (0.066) 0.660 (0.074) 0.498 (0.047) 0.614 (0.053)
>500 0.534 (0.102) 0.549 (0.099) 0.494 (0.043) 0.379 (0.044)
() standard errors
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Table 3: % of firms doing R&D
FIRMS SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.216 (0.016) 0.372 (0.030) 0.220 (0.016) 0.462 (0.034)
21-50 0.317 (0.017) 0.529 (0.034) 0.347 (0.016) 0.590 (0.026)
51-250 0.452 (0.034) 0.720 (0.037) 0.480(0.015) 0.704 (0.020)
251-500 0.632 (0.066) 0.879 (0.051) 0.561 (0.047) 0.783 (0.049)
>500 0.835 (0.079) 0.873 (0.069) 0.791 (0.044) 0.923 (0.031)
() standard errors
Table 4: Summary Statistics: Population Mean - Period 2001-2003
BANK_SHARE LENGHT NUM_BANKS
LARGE & LT 30.3299 20.0506 7.0150
(1.451) (0.819) (0.235)
LARGE & HT 32.1561 18.0048 6.8789
(2.009) (1.013) (0.260)
SMALL & LT 35.3025 16.8680 4.1788
(0.913) (0.330) (0.068)
SMALL & HT 34.0666 17.0709 4.1107
(1.558) (0.582) (0.102)
Small firms: less than 50 employees
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Table 5: Estimation results: HECKMAN BASE RESULTS
In the propensity equation the dependent variable is a dummy variable which
takes value 1 if the firm has introduced at least one product or process innovation
whereas in the intensity equation the dependent variable is a logit transformation
of the actual share of innovative sales. The exclusionary variable is g_sales[t−1]
Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1)
IE 0.2278*** (0.028) 0.1438*** (0.032)
INVEST -0.0046 (0.010) 0.0125** (0.006)
YOUNG 0.1046 (0.624) 0.0569 (0.235)
M&As 0.6525* (0.336) 0.2164 (0.149)
INTERN._COMP 0.3084 (0.228) 0.1603 (0.104)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 0.0900 (0.610) 0.1722 (0.324)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.8541** (0.887) -0.5622 (0.364)
INTERN._AGR. 0.3725 (0.328) 0.3026* (0.171)
PUBLIC_INCEN. 0.5420** (0.234) 0.2723*** (0.091)
LISTED 2.5741*** (0.870) 1.2456*** (0.372)
LOGSIZE 0.1748 (0.119) 0.2274*** (0.059)
HIGH_TECH 0.2377 (0.245) 0.1996** (0.096)
Constant -10.0413*** (1.982) -3.9594*** (0.806)
g_sales[t−1] 0.0285 (0.084)
ρ 0.9237*** 0.0234
σ 2.4707*** 0.19138
ll -35393.72
N 584 1258
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
Note: Regressions include dummies for area
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Table 6: Estimation results: HECKMAN BASE RESULTS
In the propensity equation the dependent variable is a dummy variable which
takes value 1 if the firm has introduced at least one product or process innovation
whereas in the intensity equation the dependent variable is a logit transformation
of the actual share of innovative sales. The exclusionary variable is rationed[t−1]
Intesity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1)
IE 0.2260*** (0.028) 0.1453*** (0.032)
INVEST -0.0051 (0.010) 0.0130** (0.006)
YOUNG 0.1013 (0.620) 0.0646 (0.236)
M&As 0.6440* (0.334) 0.2224 (0.150)
INTERN._COMP. 0.3010 (0.226) 0.1545 (0.105)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 0.0851 (0.603) 0.1778 (0.326)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.8268** (0.873) -0.5608 (0.364)
INTERN._AGR. 0.3658 (0.325) 0.3098* (0.172)
PUBLIC_INCEN. 0.5229** (0.234) 0.2797*** (0.092)
LISTED 2.5191*** (0.865) 1.2605*** (0.371)
LOGSIZE 0.1659 (0.119) 0.2351*** (0.059)
HIGH_TECH 0.2336 (0.245) 0.1974** (0.097)
Constant -9.8536*** (1.976) -4.0201*** (0.803)
rationedt−1 0.3398* (0.194)
ρ 0.9196*** (0.0254)
σ 2.4521*** 0.1926
ll -35360.57
N 584 1258
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
Note: Regressions include dummies for area
Table 7: Estimation results: HECKMAN ADDING FINANCIAL VARI-
ABLES
Intensity Propensity Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1)
IE 0.2349*** 0.1396*** 0.2356*** 0.1408***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
INVEST -0.0064 0.0122* -0.0064 0.0124**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
YOUNG 0.0339 0.0268 0.0831 0.0295
(0.623) (0.234) (0.615) (0.233)
M&As 0.6397* 0.2060 0.6583* 0.2181
(0.350) (0.151) (0.348) (0.152)
INTERN._COMP 0.3074 0.1652 0.3092 0.1706*
(0.234) (0.103) (0.233) (0.103)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 0.0478 0.1818 0.1366 0.2098
(0.576) (0.299) (0.547) (0.292)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.7819** -0.5457 -1.9887** -0.5056
(0.823) (0.359) (0.877) (0.366)
INTERN._AGR. 0.3818 0.2922* 0.3833 0.2778*
(0.341) (0.164) (0.334) (0.164)
PUBLIC_INCEN. 0.5859** 0.2676*** 0.5951** 0.2666***
(0.235) (0.090) (0.235) (0.091)
LISTED 2.4746*** 1.2991*** 2.7991*** 1.2784***
(0.875) (0.375) (0.815) (0.356)
BANK_SHARE 0.0114*** 0.0032** -0.0021 -0.0013
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
NUM_BANKS 0.0566 0.0306* 0.0822** 0.0347**
(0.037) (0.016) (0.040) (0.017)
LENGTH -0.0133 0.0003 0.0216* 0.0027
(0.011) (0.004) (0.013) (0.006)
FIN._INSTR -0.4861 0.2980 1.3071* 0.6892**
(0.543) (0.241) (0.730) (0.325)
SMALL -0.3079 -0.2663*** 0.3389 -0.2871
(0.223) (0.096) (0.585) (0.244)
HIGH_TECH 0.2260 0.2191** 0.2417 0.2239**
(0.250) (0.096) (0.251) (0.096)
Constant -9.6042*** -3.3918*** -10.7604*** -3.3197***
(1.882) (0.788) (1.787) (0.746)
NUM_BANKSxSMALL -0.0389 -0.0055
(0.062) (0.026)
BANK_SHARExSMALL 0.0143* 0.0048
(0.007) (0.003)
LENGTHxSMALL -0.0414** -0.0033
(0.018) (0.007)
FIN._INSTRxSMALL -2.1136** -0.4595
(0.979) (0.418)
past_sales[t−1] 0.0604 0.0631
(0.083) (0.084)
ρ 0.9462*** (0.0162) 0.9463*** (0.0160)
σ 2.5408*** (0.1895) 2.5408*** (0.1895)
ll -35236.53 -35159.27
N 584 1258 584 1258
Table 8: Estimation results: HECKMAN ADDING FINANCIAL VARI-
ABLES
Intensity Propensity Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1)
IE 0.2330*** 0.1401*** 0.2338*** 0.1409***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
INVEST -0.0067 0.0131** -0.0070 0.0134**
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
YOUNG 0.0237 0.0386 0.0374 0.0451
(0.615) (0.234) (0.612) (0.232)
M&As 0.6182* 0.1974 0.6241* 0.2127
(0.346) (0.154) (0.346) (0.154)
INTERN._COMP 0.2954 0.1536 0.2988 0.1601
(0.232) (0.104) (0.231) (0.104)
PATENTS_BOUGHT -0.0083 0.1425 0.1006 0.1695
(0.575) (0.308) (0.544) (0.305)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.7264** -0.6184* -1.9318** -0.5793*
(0.784) (0.347) (0.867) (0.351)
INTERN._AGR. 0.3411 0.2850* 0.3510 0.2722
(0.336) (0.167) (0.332) (0.168)
PUBLIC_INCEN. 0.5513** 0.2565*** 0.5535** 0.2561***
(0.235) (0.091) (0.235) (0.091)
LISTED 2.4816*** 1.5039*** 2.7548*** 1.4223***
(0.908) (0.367) (0.832) (0.351)
BANK_SHARE 0.0113*** 0.0031** -0.0051 -0.0008
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
NUM_BANKS 0.0482 0.0249 0.0520 0.0268
(0.036) (0.016) (0.040) (0.019)
LENGTH -0.0136 -0.0004 0.0165 0.0014
(0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006)
STRUMENTI_FIN -0.5045 0.3072 1.2439* 0.5693*
(0.551) (0.252) (0.731) (0.336)
LOGSIZE 0.1747 0.2080*** 0.0875 0.2174**
(0.131) (0.062) (0.181) (0.085)
HIGH_TECH 0.2062 0.2117** 0.2208 0.2192**
(0.250) (0.097) (0.250) (0.098)
NUM_BANKSxSMALL -0.0079 -0.0016
(0.049) (0.021)
BANK_SHARExSMALL 0.0178*** 0.0042
(0.007) (0.003)
LENGTHxSMALL -0.0356** -0.0026
(0.016) (0.007)
FIN._INSTRxSMALL -2.0708** -0.3200
(0.992) (0.434)
rationedt−1 0.3238* 0.3423*
(0.180) (0.184)
Constant -10.3087*** -4.6389*** -10.5396*** -4.5023***
(2.050) (0.796) (2.021) (0.808)
ρ 0.9414*** (0.0193) 0.9419*** (0.0192)
σ 2.5096*** (0.1929) 2.4956*** (0.1918)
ll -35136.9 -35059.69
N 584 1258 584 1258
Table 9: Estimation results: HECKMAN CONSIDERING EXTERNAL
FINANCIAL NEED
Intensity Propensity Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1)
IE 0.2315*** 0.1394*** 0.2329*** 0.1414***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
INVEST -0.0028 0.0137** -0.0011 0.0164***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
YOUNG 0.0589 0.0349 0.0153 0.0092
(0.623) (0.236) (0.620) (0.237)
M&As 0.6694** 0.1899 0.7073** 0.1828
(0.339) (0.151) (0.338) (0.146)
INTERN._COMP 0.2819 0.1556 0.2742 0.1523
(0.232) (0.104) (0.232) (0.104)
PATENTS_BOUGHT -0.0242 0.1090 -0.0681 0.1279
(0.557) (0.308) (0.554) (0.308)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.7275** -0.6081* -1.6896** -0.6061*
(0.776) (0.343) (0.781) (0.346)
INTERN._AGR. 0.3489 0.2826* 0.3659 0.2738*
(0.340) (0.167) (0.337) (0.164)
PUBLIC_INCEN. 0.5459** 0.2431*** 0.5455** 0.2429***
(0.232) (0.090) (0.232) (0.090)
LISTED 2.2482** 1.4324*** 2.2022** 1.3657***
(0.900) (0.366) (0.890) (0.385)
LOGSIZE 0.1524 0.1965*** 0.1306 0.1935***
(0.131) (0.062) (0.130) (0.062)
EFN -4.3803** -0.9732 -0.0462 3.0891
(1.862) (0.786) (4.523) (2.054)
BANK_SHARE 0.0115*** 0.0031** 0.0070 -0.0023
(0.004) (0.002) (0.029) (0.013)
NUM_BANKS 0.0525 0.0260 0.2629 0.2777**
(0.036) (0.016) (0.225) (0.121)
LENGTH -0.0132 -0.0001 0.0671 0.0636**
(0.011) (0.004) (0.087) (0.032)
FINANCIAL_INSTR -0.4046 0.3407 -0.3583 0.3599
(0.543) (0.251) (0.538) (0.245)
HIGH_TECH -0.0297 0.1643 -0.0374 0.1775*
(0.261) (0.105) (0.261) (0.105)
Constant -7.6269*** -3.9733*** -9.6406*** -5.9070***
(2.289) (0.903) (3.105) (1.299)
NUM_BANKSxEFN -0.4255 -0.4942**
(0.436) (0.235)
BANK_SHARExEFN 0.0094 0.0110
(0.058) (0.026)
LENGTHxEFN -0.1608 -0.1264**
(0.172) (0.064)
g_sales[t−1] 0.0490 0.0510
(0.082) (0.083)
ρ 0.9425*** (0.0186) 0.9449*** (0.0176)
σ 2.5057*** (0.1902) 2.5071*** 0.2131
ll -35113.2 -35011.31
N 584 1258 584 1258
*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Note: Regressions include dummies for area
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Table 11: Estimation results: CONDITIONAL LOGIT
In this model only switchers - that is, firms that introduced an innovation in
just one of the two periods - contribute to the likelihood function. It controls
for unobserved firm characteristics that are constant over time. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm introduced an innovation in
just one of the two periods
(1) (2)
IE 0.0942
(0.091)
INVEST 0.0592***
(0.020)
R&D 1.1852***
(0.295)
INVE 0.0705***
(0.022)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.4270 -0.9091
(1.185) (1.031)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 1.0923 0.4738
(1.671) (1.057)
INTERN._AGR. 1.6552*** 1.5007**
(0.534) (0.612)
M&As 1.1833*** 0.7833*
(0.385) (0.436)
INTERN._COMP 0.3529 0.3976
(0.393) (0.399)
LOGSIZE 0.5377 0.6246
(0.541) (0.543)
PUBLIC_INCEN. 0.4973** 0.5279**
(0.238) (0.248)
LISTED 2.6798** 2.5719**
(1.351) (1.301)
BANK_SHARE 0.0448** 0.0430**
(0.021) (0.018)
NUM_BANKS 0.1362 0.0741
(0.107) (0.110)
LENGTH -0.0074 0.0003
(0.019) (0.002)
FIN._INSTR 0.6966 0.9219*
(0.487) (0.501)
BANK_SHARE*SMALL -0.0478** -0.0481***
(0.021) (0.018)
NUM_BANKS*SMALL -0.0129 0.0748
(0.115) (0.118)
LENGTH*SMALL 0.0116 0.0028
(0.020) (0.002)
SALES 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
ll -4161.4137 -4211.8384
N 320 344
*p<0.10,** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table 12: Estimation results: CONDITIONAL LOGIT
In this model only switchers - that is, firms that introduced an innovation in
just one of the two periods - contribute to the likelihood function. It controls
for unobserved firm characteristics that are constant over time. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm introduced an innovation in
just one of the two periods
(1) (2)
IE 0.0900
(0.101)
INVEST 0.0589***
(0.021)
R&D 1.1740***
(0.292)
INVE 0.0676***
(0.022)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.3398 -0.8299
(1.310) (1.152)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 1.7168 0.6122
(1.677) (0.958)
INTERN._AGR. 1.7995*** 1.6157***
(0.553) (0.590)
M&As 1.1113*** 0.6764
(0.402) (0.448)
INTERN._COMP 0.4203 0.4472
(0.376) (0.373)
LOGSIZE 0.8827** 0.9098**
(0.442) (0.459)
PUBLIC_INCEN. 0.5625** 0.6107**
(0.239) (0.249)
LISTED 0.9050 1.0268
(1.179) (1.114)
BANK_SHARE -0.0064 -0.0103*
(0.006) (0.006)
NUM_BANKS 0.1015 0.1081
(0.091) (0.105)
LENGTH 0.0034** 0.0029***
(0.002) (0.001)
FIN._INSTR 0.6187 0.8385
(0.507) (0.536)
BANK_SHARE*HIGH_TECH 0.0142 0.0223**
(0.013) (0.011)
NUM_BANKS*HIGH_TECH 0.2271 0.1813
(0.209) (0.230)
LENGTH*HIGH_TECH -0.0031 -0.0025**
(0.002) (0.001)
SALES -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
ll -4191.3611 -4124.6814
N 320 344
*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
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